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This Article presents an empirical, doctrinal, and theoretical critique of public engagement
in the modern administrative state. The legitimacy of the administrative state depends on
the claim that it provides opportunities for public engagement as well as a mechanism for
expert scientific decisionmaking. A typical rulemaking proceeding lets experts make
technical judgments about terrorism, transportation, or telecommunications subject to
court review guarding against arbitrariness. The whole process is then enmeshed in a
system that is supposed to provide engagement – and therefore democratic accountability -through presidential appointments and control, congressional oversight, and the public
notice-and-comment process. This existing approach is legitimated by “administrative
pluralism,” a way of thinking that emphasizes the value of interest-group competition in
shaping regulatory policy. While administrative pluralism helps legitimate regulatory
policy in the eyes of jurists, scholars, and the public, it also suppresses implicit questions
about how much expert judgment is required in regulatory decisions, and whether the
extent of participatory democracy and responsiveness is sufficient. The problems are not
abstract. They are easily demonstrated in the course of a specific regulatory rulemaking
proceeding, involving Section 314 of the USA Patriot Act (governing law enforcement’s
access to financial information). The task of balancing privacy concerns and law
enforcement objectives hardly seems like the exclusive province of experts. Individuals and
interest groups did have a chance to submit comments in the rulemaking proceeding, but
virtually all the comments taken seriously by the regulatory agency were sophisticated
statements made by financial institutions and their lawyers. While over 70% of comments
came from individuals concerned about privacy, the agency did not even address these in
its final rule. Despite the administrative pluralism model’s tenacious hold, at least two
alternatives exist to involve the public in rulemaking proceedings such as those governing
Section 314, both of which involve constituting a small group of people whose discussions
can inform the regulatory process. Participants can be either selected by lot from the entire
population (a “majoritarian deliberation” approach), or chosen by the agency from among
constituencies (such as outside experts) who may be especially impacted by the regulation
but are essentially unrepresented (a “corrective” approach). These approaches can
generate valuable information about what informed citizens think of regulatory proposals.
The technical challenge of implementing the alternatives is far from insurmountable,
though difficult questions arise about selecting deliberation groups, framing the issue, and
giving legal effect to the public’s participation. Instead, two larger challenges remain.
First is the challenge of choosing among different concepts of “administrative democracy”
to combine expertise and participation. Second is the challenge of overcoming a political
economy that strongly favors the status quo.
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Broad delegation to the Executive is the hallmark of the modern
administrative state; agency rulemaking powers are the rule rather than, as they
once were, the exception; and as the sheer number of modern departments and
1
agencies suggests, we are awash in agency “expertise.”
--Antonin Scalia
Judicial Deference to Administrative
Interpretations of Law
[T]he express role of the public in democratic politics is not to act
narrowly as a jury, as finders of fact. They are instead empowered to serve as
2
judges, as arbiters of what ought to be done.
--Paul Sniderman
Taking Sides: A Fixed Choice Theory of
Political Reasoning
[A] well-functioning democracy seeks above all to produce policies that
will, in fact, improve people’s lives… The task for the future is to develop
3
institutions that will respond to people’s values, not to their errors.
--Cass Sunstein
Risk and Reason

INTRODUCTION
Suppose after a terrorist attack federal officials want more access to the
public’s private financial information. Prosecutors, investigators, and their
superiors contend such access could help reduce the risk of terrorist attacks and
fight serious crimes. The legislature passes a statute to that effect, but does not
work out the details. The question then arises how those details will be worked
out, and how the public will take part in developing a regulation that will
potentially affect just about everyone in the country.

1

Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J.
511, 516-17.
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Paul Sniderman, Taking Sides: A Fixed Choice Theory of Political Reasoning, in ELEMENTS OF
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To be more specific, consider the implications of Section 314 of the
USA Patriot Act. This obscure little post-September 11 provision calls for
regulations encouraging “further cooperation among financial institutions, their
regulatory authorities, and law enforcement authorities.”4 Because of the
statute’s ambiguity, the agency wielded a lot of discretion when it wrote the
regulations. It could engineer anything ranging from a pipeline for law
enforcement access to private financial information, to mild requirement for
financial institutions to have informal meetings with law enforcement every
year.5
According to the prevailing approach to public engagement in the
administrative state, the rulemaking process governing the Section 314
regulations should reflect a distinctive blend of ingredients: expert
decisionmaking by the Treasury Department, democratic accountability through
representative democracy and public comments taken seriously by the agency,
6
and judicial review against arbitrariness. One might surmise that banks would
have something to say about these rules. But only under the narrowest definition
of “interest” could anyone say that only banks possess an interest in those rules.
Individuals ranging from bank employees to farmworkers can have some sort of
disaggregated interest in the efficacy of national security and law enforcement
policies. Immigrants who make international money transfers, investment
bankers, and many other people in between might have some concern about how
their financial records would give away their secrets. The public at large might
care how the Section 314 regulations fit into a larger web of laws affecting
privacy.
All of which makes what actually happened with Section 314 somewhat
striking: the agency took a little-noticed, vague statute and turned it into an
efficient new mechanism for channeling private financial information to federal
law enforcement while prohibiting notification of the subjects of the request.7
While over 70% of the public comments received came from laypeople
4

See USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56 (USAPA). Section 314 of the Act is an
uncodified provision that appears in the Historical and Statutory Notes to 31 U.S.C. 5311.
Section 5311 is part of the BSA, and regulations implementing it appear at 31 CFR part 103.
Since the authority of the Treasury Secretary to administer the BSA has been delegated to the
Director of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), then FinCEN has
responsibility for developing the regulations under Section 314. The statute admittedly provides
a bit – though not much – more detail than what I have quoted above in establishing goals for the
regulations. For the full statutory text and additional details on the regulatory scheme, see infra
Part II.a.
5
The regulations the agency actually crafted, discussed in Part II, are reported in Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network; Special Information Sharing Procedures to Deter Money
Laundering and Terrorist Activity, 67 FED. REG. 60579, 60580-82 (September 26, 2002)
(discussing comments received and making no mention of privacy concerns raised by
commenters) (hereinafter, “Section 314 Final Rule Statement”).
6
See infra Part I.
7
See infra Part II.a.
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concerned about their privacy, the agency appeared to ignore these
unsophisticated comments, failing even to mention privacy as a concern in its
discussion of the final rule. Instead Treasury made various administrative
changes in its proposed rules in response to the roughly 30% of comments from
businesses and their representatives.8 Public interest organizations that normally
care about privacy did not appear to participate in the rulemaking proceeding,
perhaps in part because they had their hands full with other activities at a time of
massive legal changes.9
Of course it’s possible to take this as little more than a parable about the
futility of mass public involvement in the regulatory process. No regulatory
“public defender” stands ready to help laypeople plead their case to the agency.
Clearly the political economy of regulation favors strong organized interests, not
10
unsophisticated laypeople concerned about financial privacy. An agency facing
time and resource constraint can hardly be expected to digest a jumble of
unsophisticated comments from the public. If there is any real source of
democratic legitimacy in the administrative state (in this view), it is found in
oversight from representative politicians who can reverse the agency anytime.
There is, however, a different way to think about the Section 314 story,
one that begins with two insights: that public engagement is supposed to make
the administrative state more legitimate, and that in practical terms, engagement
can mean something other than just waiting for interested parties to participate.
Regardless of the substantive merits of the new regulations, Section 314 seems
to raise the kind of balancing issue that calls for some sort of democratic
participation. Indeed, upon reflection it’s not altogether obvious that the
political logic of the administrative state would preclude some alternative means
of public consultation about how to balance security and privacy.11 If some kind
of public participation in the regulatory process is supposed to engender
legitimacy, what then do we make of the experience with Section 314? Indeed,
what is public engagement supposed to accomplish, and what should it be
expected to actually achieve given practical and political constraints?
This article tries to make sense of these questions. My method is to
conduct an empirical case study of public participation in an unfamiliar
regulatory context – involving criminal justice and the war on terrorism – and
then to illustrate how the insights obtained are also relevant to more familiar

8

See infra Part II.b.
See id.
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See infra Part I.b.
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See infra Part V. See also JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., THE HOLLOW CORE: PRIVATE INTERESTS IN
NATIONAL POLICY MAKING 11 (1993)(“The interest group literature, on the whole, is remarkably
unclear about the nature of the roles of government actors in the policy-making process – that is
about the nature of the relationships between private groups and public officials. Much of the
literature virtually ignores the officials and appears to assume that, like billiard balls, they will go
wherever the interest groups send them.”).
9
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regulatory domains.12 Surprisingly few academic studies assess public
participation in regulatory policy,13 and the prescriptive literature on reforming
14
the process also appears relatively thin. This is ironic since commentators and
lawyers alike often assume that public participation – when coupled with judicial
review and legislative oversight – is part what makes the administrative state
legitimate.15 What often remains unclear is what kind of participation should be
expected, or even what should be sought in order to make the administrative
state legitimate. Some critics might deride the link between legitimacy and
public participation, and the notice-and-comment process in particular, as a
charade that simply lets powerful interest groups engage in rent-seeking.16 But
that view does not obviously follow from a belief that incentives shape political
activity,17 nor does it explain the complicated institutional details of the
12

While most of my attention here is on federal regulation, my argument is also relevant to local,
state, and transnational regulation. Obviously regulatory systems are somewhat different across
legal systems and levels of government. But they all have to grapple with questions about the
legitimacy of the regulating authority, the extent of desirable and feasible participatory
democracy, and the centrality of expert decisionmaking.
13
For two notable exceptions, see Steven J. Balla, Administrative Procedures and Political
Control of the Bureaucracy, 92 AM. POLI. SCI. REV. 663 (1998)(finding that Medicare
regulations developed pursuant to the regulatory notice-and-comment process appeared to have
been impacted by comments from physicians expecting reductions in payments under the new
rules); CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING 157-203 (2 ed. 1999)(discussing the extent of
public participation in regulatory rulemaking proceedings, and concluding that such participation
primarily reflects a process where “interest groups are the major forces”).
14
The prescriptive literature on participation in policymaking (and, by extension, in regulation)
tends to fall into two categories: (1) philosophical discussions of the value of participation in
policymaking in general (without strong attention to the intricacies of regulatory policy, or
institutional detail); or (2) discussions of specialized issues like regulatory negotiation or the use
of technology to facilitate participation. For some interesting examples of the former, see Joshua
Cohen, An Epistemic Conception of Democracy, 97 ETHICS 26, 27-29 (1986); JAMES S. FISHKIN,
THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE: PUBLIC OPINION AND DEMOCRACY (1995). For examples of the
latter, see Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000);
Cary Coglianese, The Internet and Public Participation in Rulemaking, KSG WORKING PAPER
SERIES
NO.
RWP03-022
(2003),
avail.
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=421161.
15
th
See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act: Legislative History, S.Doc. No. 248, 79 Cong., 2d
Sess. 191 (1947) (noting that the “principal purpose” of the notice and comment provisions in the
APA was to “provide that the legislative functions of the administrative agencies shall as far as
possible be exercised only upon participation on notice…”). See also NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon
Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764 (1969) (public participation in rulemaking proceeding is meant to ensure
that the regulation is response to the interests and needs of those regulated); Texaco, Inc. v.
Federal Power Commission, 412 F.3d 740, 744 (3d Cir. 1969) (participation by parties with an
interest in the regulatory rulemaking proceeding ensures that agencies’ decisions are based upon
relevant information).
16
See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN AND GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 233-48
(1962). See also Jonathan Macey, Cynicism and Trust in Politics and Constitutional Theory, 87
CORNELL L. REV. 280 (2002).
17
See, e.g., McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J. LAW,
ECON & ORG. 180 (1999) (where the focus is not on creating a “charade” but on obtaining
ND
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administrative process.18 Still other observers might defend the existing
approach to public engagement – which seems to be premised on the idea that
most of what an agency does is just to apply expert judgment to a problem
defined by the legislature and overseen by the political branches.19
Admittedly, people’s views about the appropriate degree and kind of
public engagement in the administrative state should be driven a lot by their
overall conceptions of democracy, and particularly their conceptions about what
makes the administrative state itself legitimate in a democracy. Section 314 may
have been enacted by the legislature, but the legislators entrusted the regulators
with the harder task of figuring out exactly what balance to strike between
security and financial privacy. This illustrates how the administrative state often
combines a lot of power with broad legislative delegation. The legitimacy of
any legal or political institution might always be questioned, but the
administrative state’s power and the indirect nature in which it exercises power
20
might be seen to exacerbate uncertainties about its legitimacy.
In response to such doubts, defenders of the administrative state often
point to certain institutional features that help legitimize things like the Section
314 regulations, or in fact the entire administrative state.21 While the details
depend on who you ask and for what purpose (i.e., theoretical exploration versus
formal legal argument), the legitimacy-enhancing features are often taken to
include the opportunity for the public to get involved in regulatory
information about the strength and preferences of interest groups competing over policy
outcomes).
18
See Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1998) (noting that existing positive theories, by themselves, do not fully
explain the institutional details of the regulatory process).
19
Courts constantly emphasize the importance of deferring to expert agencies. See, e.g., Pattern
Makers’ Leage of North America, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 115 (1985) (upholding
agency decision regarding an unfair labor practice because the “Board has the primary
responsibility for applying ‘the general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial
life’”); National Rifle Ass’n v. Reno, 216 F.3d 122, 134 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (affirming dismissal of
a complaint against a Justice Department practice of creating a temporary audit log of gun
purchasers, on the ground that “it is the agencies, not the courts, that have the technical
expertise… to carry out statutory mandates”).
20
See infra Part III.a. But see Posner and Vermeule, supra note___, at ___.
21
A lot has been written defending the legitimacy of the administrative state on the basis of its
institutional features. The literature tends to emphasize the impact of political constraints on
agency decisionmaking. For some examples, see, e.g., Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule,
Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1748 (2002)(“Congress is
accountable when it delegates power – it is accountable for its decision to delegate power to the
agency. If the agency performs its function poorly, citizens will hold Congress responsible for
the poor design of the agency, or for giving it too much power or not enough…”); Martin
Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447, 491 (1986)(defending rulemaking
from a perceived “wholesale synoptic attack on rulemaking discretion,” and implying that
rulemaking requires little judicial scrutiny because of its “political, discretionary, incremental
nature”).
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decisionmaking.22 Public involvement could help constrain the abuse of power
in the administrative state. It could be part of the process for developing
accountability between the key constituencies of the administrative state and the
real-world actions of its institutions. Some form of public involvement could
also provide regulators with valuable information about the costs, benefits, and
administrative challenges associated with certain proposals. Of course such
involvement is not taken to call for some kind of direct democracy.23 On the
contrary. It borders on madness (one would think) to believe that members of
the lay public could play some constructive role in regulatory policy. But then
what is the sort of public involvement that is legitimacy-enhancing?
If the question is taken to mean, “what are the specific legal features
allowing for public involvement in the administrative state?” then it is pretty
easy to answer: formally the public can get involved in the administrative state
through a mixture of mechanisms. One is the notice-and-comment process that
governs most regulatory rulemaking.24 Interest groups also have occasional direct
contact with the agency.25 The public can also have an indirect impact through
legislators and the president – who share power to oversee the agencies of the
administrative state. But how should we evaluate these structures and their realworld operation? Without broadening the question, we end up with something
pretty circular: the structures that exist are adequate because those are the ones
that exist. If the question is understood to be more broad, in the sense of how
these legal structures should be evaluated, then there are really two strands of
thinking about what kind of participation contributes to legitimacy.
The first strand is participatory democracy. It focuses on the importance
of involving the public at large – whether they are individuals, unofficial
associations, organized interest groups, or powerful interested parties – in
developing rules like those implementing Section 314.26 In this approach, broadbased participation matters for two reasons: individual members of the public
22

See infra Part I.
And why not just a referendum on regulatory policy? The short answer is that voters’ initial,
uniformed, and unsophisticated impressions may not correspond with the views they would have
given more information and a chance to talk about the issue. When voters have time,
information, and a chance to deliberate, their opinions often change. See generally JAMES F.
FISHKIN & ROBERT C. LUSKIN, BRINGING DELIBERATION TO THE DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE, IN
THE POLL WITH A HUMAN FACE (Maxwell McCombs & May Reynolds eds., 1999).. See also
Julian Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L. J. 1503 (1990).
24
See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551. Most of the exceptions to the APA noticeand-comment rulemaking process involve foreign affairs and national security. See id., at
Section 553. But as Section 314 demonstrates, some of the default requirements for rulemaking
contained in the APA still apply to a number of regulations affecting areas ranging from criminal
finance enforcement to immigration.
25
Ex parte contacts are generally allowed in notice-and-comment rulemaking, but courts have
imposed restrictions when the proceedings functionally resemble adjudication or licensing. See,
e.g., Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.d 221 (D.C.Cir. 1959).
26
See Part I.a, supra.
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will be affected by regulations, and policy choices should not be driven only by
those who think in terms of their self-interest.27 Nothing here implies a need for
direct democracy on every issue, nor is there necessarily a sense that the
legislative process is always participatory. But the focus here is on trying to
ensure that regulatory policy issues attract a decent share of public attention.28
This is represented in the impulse some regulatory agencies occasionally have
for public hearings and “town meetings” that go “past” organized interests.
Much of the early rhetoric about the administrative state is at least consistent
with this approach, even if it’s not exactly clear what it should mean in terms of
institutions.
The second strand, which I call administrative pluralism, is more
pragmatic.29 The focus is on groups and organized interests. They do the heavy
lifting when it comes to legitimizing rulemaking proceedings like those
involving Section 314. They should be expected to raise concerns ranging from
administrability to privacy to the benefits to law enforcement that could be
achieved through the regulation. Public engagement means engaging those
groups, who have a measure of responsibility and expertise to supplement what
is considered to be a really technical, complicated, scientific process. The
competition between interest groups informs the regulatory process and also
helps politicians control agency problems that they might otherwise have with
regulatory agencies.
More so than participatory democracy, it is the
administrative pluralism strand that calls for what the existing approach to public
engagement is able to deliver: a chance for expert, organized interest groups to
take part in shaping regulations.30
Despite their differences, both of these approaches have implicit positive
and normative components.
For example, the descriptive aspect of
administrative pluralism might be grounded on two research traditions:
skepticism of mass democracy, and an attention to the susceptibility of the
administrative state to control from organized interest groups (with “agency
capture” being just one crude way of putting things).
Normatively,
administrative pluralism takes the fact of political power vested in organized
interest groups and suggests this is not a bad thing at all. In any case, the larger
point is this. The two strands helping to define what is really meant by saying
that public engagement is important are not just deeply felt, deontological
positions. They are built on particular suppositions and intuitions (both positive
and normative), all of which can (and should) be scrutinized.
As the reader will better grasp following Part II, once such scrutiny is
provided for its suppositions, administrative pluralism turns out not to be very
27

Id.
Which is, by the way, why this strand implies that it is not enough to emphasize the role
representative politicians play in the oversight of the administrative state. Mass electoral support
rarely turns on questions of regulatory policy. See infra Part III.a.
29
See Part I.b, supra.
30
Id.
28
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satisfying as the exclusive approach to involving the public in the
administrative state, for several reasons. First, some of its basic premises are
questionable, or at least context-dependent.31 For example, an implicit premise
of administrative pluralism is that agency problems between leaders and
members of interest groups are not so great that they undermine the value of the
participation by organized interest groups. Yet there can be substantial agency
problems.32 And so too with another implicit claim, which is that interest groups
will tend to provide expert, sophisticated commentary on the most normatively
important dimensions of a particular regulatory problem.33 But that did not
happen with Section 314. Not a single organization concerned about civil
liberties and capable of submitting sophisticated comments, such as the
American Civil Liberties Union or the Electronic Frontier Foundation, provided
comments. Indeed, doing so is probably a lot harder in times of crisis where a
deluge of legal changes unfold at the same time. One can also question the
implicit contentions that regulatory policy is primarily – if not exclusively -34
about expert judgment, and that the larger public does not care about it. While
most comments came from individual people concerned about privacy, these
comments displayed little understanding of the law or the agency’s responsibility
under it. In part as a result, the agency did not even address these in its Federal
Register statement, nor did it make a single change in the proposed regulation as
35
a result of these comments. Second, administrative pluralism is not the only
feasible means of involving the larger public in regulatory policy, both because
(a) the lay public’s sophistication and interest are not fixed, and (b) some groups
that may not ordinarily participate in notice-and-comment rulemaking (like nonaligned experts) may have both an interest and sophistication.36 Third, the
31

See infra Part II.b.
See TERRY M. MOE, THE ORGANIZATION OF INTERESTS __ (1981).
33
See infra Part II.b.
34
See infra Part II.b.
35
See Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Special Information Sharing Procedures to Deter
Money Laundering and Terrorist Activity, 67 FED. REG. 60579, 60580-82 (September 26, 2002)
(discussing comments received and making no mention of privacy concerns raised by
commenters) (hereinafter, “Section 314 Final Rule Statement”). See the Appendix, infra, for
examples of the comments. Note that the vast majority of non-business comments were not
sophisticated yet they raised recognizable themes that (a) raised an arguably important
substantive concern with the rules (i.e., privacy). For all their unsophistication, some comments
even seemed to offer insights that are consistent with the positions that scholars take in academic
debates. For example, some commenters implied that regulatory policies can be constitutionally
problematic even if they are consistent with a judicial conception of the Constitution. See infra
Part II.a. Others were concerned about unintended or even perverse consequences from law
enforcement policies. See id. In any case, the commenters don’t use the “right” language. For
example, the ones concerned about the Constitution don’t say, “The Miller case goes too far, and
since I’ve read Larry Kramer and Mark Tushnet I believe that constitutional interpretation should
be driven in part by the public’s own thinking – and that’s the sort of thinking I’m doing right
here.” But the comment is at least consistent with this more sophisticated formulation.
36
See infra Part III.
32
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underlying theory of democracy involved in administrative pluralism may not
be persuasive to everyone, or for every issue. And in some cases this is for good
reason. One may believe that majoritarian deliberation should inform regulatory
policy, or that people with an interest but no representation in the existing
arrangement should have some representation.37
Having critiqued the administrative pluralism strand, I then consider in
Parts III and IV how to advance realistic alternatives consistent with the
participatory democracy strand.
I develop corrective and majoritarian
deliberation approaches. The corrective approach would involve designing a
mechanism to sample people that should obviously have interest but are not
adequately represented (with some appropriate metric for making this decision).
The majoritarian deliberation approach would involve getting a random sample
of the population as a whole.38 Either one of the alternative approaches could
involve selecting a small group or groups through random sampling (or stratified
random sampling) of some population. In principle, individuals and groups
consulted through these alternative approaches could offer both their raw initial
opinions but also their reactions to information about the nature of the agency’s
mandate, the scientific and technical problems with different regulatory
possibilities, and the views of different constituencies that would be affected by
the regulation.39 The existence of these alternatives does not mean the existing
approach is always wrong: letting participation be driven by self-designated
interested parties might make sense, or it might not. Like everything in life,
these alternatives have costs – but they should be judged alongside their
potential benefits. That is exactly the point: choosing between all these
approaches poses the question of when it is just fine to use the existing pluralist
approach, when we should be more interested in including people affected but
not organized to participate, and when it is better to let regulatory decisions be
informed by deliberation groups that are explicitly majoritarian in nature.
While there is plenty of reason to rethink public engagement, my project
is not meant to fixall the limitations of regulatory policy by rec alibrating public
participation.40 Enough has been written already about the virtues of dialogic

37

Indeed, by using the alternatives to the existing approach – which I discuss in Part IV –
agencies may be better able to do some things that could improve regulation. Regulators could
gain insights about how to explain regulatory functions to the public, and how to foster
compliance with regulations. See infra Part IV.
38
Obviously, at some level the entire population has some kind of “interest,” so the distinction
between the two approaches is driven by how low one sets the “interest” threshold.
39
Nothing about these alternatives makes them incompatible with principled risk analysis, or
with defensible versions of cost-benefit analysis. See Part IV.c.
40
Some commentators have pointed out that the administrative state has a bias against regulation.
See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE AND PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION (2000).
Indeed, the political economy of regulation may give agencies an incentive to systematically
under-regulate. I do not address this problem directly, but neither do I believe the proposals here
would exacerbate the problem.
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deliberation.41 My goal here is not to insist that whatever ails the administrative
state can be healed through including more stakeholders in regulatory
policymaking or through more public deliberation. Instead I want to show that
the default embrace of the administrative pluralism approach to public
participation in regulatory policy is neither indispensable nor particularly
persuasive. Instead of an antidote to resolve all the difficult questions in
regulatory policy, I am offering observations about how the law of the
administrative state shapes the process of deciding on what those difficult
questions really are.
I.
THERE ARE TWO STRANDS OF THOUGHT ABOUT PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT IN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Not a single major function of government escapes the influence of
42
regulatory policy. Under the existing approach to public engagement in the
administrative state, the public gets some opportunity to participate in regulatory
decisions affecting matters ranging from campaign contribution rules to
carcinogen control. Because of their role authorizing statutes, appropriating
funds, and overseeing agency activity, the legislature and the President act as
constraints on agencies.43
Moreover, presidents hire and fire agency
administrators. Even members of independent agencies may be sensitive to the
White House agenda. In most rulemaking proceedings, people and interest
groups have a right to participate through APA notice-and-comment procedures.
The right for the public to comment, coupled with legal requirements that the
agency must give reasons for what it does,44 implies has some kind of legal
responsibility to consider significant issues raised in public comments.45
41

For a reasonable introduction to this burgeoning literature (replete with the obligatory cites to
Habermas), see JAMES BOHMAN, PUBLIC DELIBERATION: PLURALISM, COMPLEXITY, AND
DEMOCRACY (1996). But see James A. Gardner, Shut Up and Vote: A Critique of Deliberative
Democracy and the Life of Talk, 63 TENN. L. REV. 421, 447 (1996).
42
The average number of pages in the annual Code of Federal Regulations grew about 50%
between the Ford and Clinton Administrations, from an average of 71,982 during the Ford
administration to 134,173 during the Clinton presidency. Kerwin, supra note ___, at 21.
43
See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY 235-276 (1989) (discussing how representative
politicians act as shape and constrain the work of bureaucrats). See also infra Part V., at ____.
44
See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (agency must provide
explanation for its decision, and decision reviewed on the basis of the full rulemaking record).
The full record includes all the comments submitted by the public.
45
Let me expand on this. It is generally accepted that an agency must consider all the important
dimensions of a regulatory problem – and surely this includes significant dimensions of the
problem elucidated in public comments. See Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d
375, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1973) cert. denied 417 U.S. 921 (1974). See also Ronald M. Levin,
Nonlegislative Rules and the Administrative Open Mind, 41 Duke L.J. 1497, 1501 n.19 (1992)
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While it is clear that the public gets to participate directly through the
notice and comment process and indirectly through representative politicians, it
is much less clear what that participation is supposed to accomplish in the
existing approach. Some might say that participation breeds legitimacy, but this
just pushes the question back one step, since there are at least two different
strands of thinking about how public engagement promotes legitimacy. One
strand, which might be labeled participatory democracy, exalts the value of mass
participation as an important ingredient in regulatory policymaking. Whether
through letter-writing appeals to legislators or the notice-and-comment process,
the participatory democracy strand emphasizes the value in counterbalancing the
natural insularity of the regulatory process. This strand finds some support in
the legal structures of the administrative state, which allow for participation from
individual and informal groups as well as organized interests. Another approach,
which could be called “administrative pluralism,” is more pragmatic. This
strand not only acknowledges but lauds the role organized interests play in
regulatory policymaking. Administrative pluralism does not expect citizens to
rush home from their job so that they can send in comments to some regulatory
agency. Instead the focus is on interested participants and the interaction
between them. Their competition is thought to enhance the quality and
legitimacy of regulatory policy. One has to disentangle these two strands to
make any headway in understanding public engagement in the administrative
state. Once the two strands are disentangled, two things become clear. First,
administrative pluralism seems more pragmatic because it appears to be
consistent with the way the public seems to get involved in regulatory policy.
Second, the viability of administrative pluralism as a theory of legitimacy for the
administrative state really depends on a number of empirical suppositions that
should be subject to scrutiny.
(citing Portland Cement Ass’n); Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal
Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 282 (1987) (agencies must
respond to all serious dimensions of the problem raised in comments). On the other hand, courts
tend to give agencies a good deal of discretion to decide precisely how to handle comments.
This makes it hard to fix the precise counters of the agency’s responsibility to respond to
individual comments. See, e.g., Center for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336, 1355 n.15 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (“An agency need not address every conceivable issue or alternative, no matter how
remote or insignificant.”); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); But cf. Ronald M. Levin, Direct Final Rulemaking, 64 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1, 27 (1995) (“To be sure, an agency has broad discretion to set its agenda and to
deal with problems one step at a time. Nevertheless, the agency's self-interest lies in making a
strong record to respond to pleas to go further than it would prefer; brushing such comments
aside can be counterproductive.”) (footnote omitted). What must be reconciled is (a) the
agency’s responsibility to consider important dimensions of the problem, (b) the public’s right to
comment, and (c) the agency’s discretion in handling individual comments. Perhaps the most
viable way to reconcile these legal principles is to conclude that the agency may not ignore
qualitatively important dimensions of the problem that raised in the course of the notice-andcomment process (i.e., by some substantial proportion of the comments in the aggregate).
Moreover, if the notice-and-comment process is supposed to serve a valuable function
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A. The Participatory Democracy Strand Emphasizes the Value of Participation
by Individuals, Informal Associations, and Organized Interests
If we must accept an administrative state of faceless bureaucratic
administrative agencies, how can we ensure that its decisions are both sound and
legitimate? Proponents of the administrative state and courts reviewing
administrative decisions have often emphasized the importance of participatory
democracy in the administrative state as part of the answer. By “participatory
democracy,” I mean some kind of process allowing individuals, informal
associations, and organized interests to have a say in regulatory policy.
46
Participation (goes the theory) is central to democracy, and thus crucial to
reconciling democratic aspirations with the bureaucratic machinery of the
administrative state.
Defenders of the administrative state suggest that it is more legitimate
because of such participation. So do courts reviewing administrative action.
Indeed, the mechanisms of the administrative state seem to reflect a concern with
some kind of participatory democracy. With few exceptions, members of the
public have a legal right to take part in the regulatory process, regardless of
whether they are savvy lawyers for a chemical products company or individual
laypeople people with no particular technical expertise.47 This makes intuitive
sense, since regulations are forged from statutes passed in the name of
everyone.48 The regulations themselves are obviously important: often they have
the force of law just as a civil or criminal statute would.49 They affect a
pervasive and growing share of the nation’s domestic and international
decisions. Participation helps render that power legitimate in two ways.
Regulations affect the public and are promulgated in its name; members of the
public should therefore be able to affect the regulation because they have an

46

See SIDNEY VERBA, KAY SCHLOZMAN, AND HENRY BRADY, VOICE AND EQUALITY: CIVIC
VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN POLITICS 1 (1995)(“Citizen participation is at the heart of
democracy. Indeed, democracy is unthinkable without the ability of citizens to participate freely
in the governing process.”).
47
Most of the exceptions to the APA notice-and-comment rulemaking process involve foreign
affairs and national security. But as Section 314 demonstrates, some of the default requirements
for rulemaking contained in the APA still apply to a number of regulations affecting areas
ranging from criminal finance enforcement to immigration.
48
By “regulations,” I mean primarily the regulatory rules enacted pursuant to the notice-andcomment process (also known as “informal rulemaking”) established by the Administrative
Procedure Act, or pursuant to a similar process that allows the public to participate in rulemaking
in some way.
49
See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill and Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules With the Force of Law:
The Original Convention 116 HARV. L. REV. 467 (2002).
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interest in the regulation.50 And mass participation can offset self-interested
political activity involving organized interests, helping to offset this with some
sort of deliberative citizen activity.
At least in some ways, the structure of the administrative state is set up to
force it to react to citizen participation in administrative decisions. Legislators
can influence the work of agencies in response to a rare but powerful burst of
public attention to some matter of regulatory policy. Agencies are legally
required to consider comments raising important issues, regardless of who they
come from. Of course, nothing in the participatory democracy strand makes
participation infinitely valuable: after some point decisions must be taken, and
policies must be executed.51 What this strand seems to imply is rather that
efficiency values should be balanced against the importance of participation, and
that such participation should regularly allow people to have an effect on
regulatory policy. If the existing notice-and-comment, expertise-focused
structure of administrative law does not allow this to happen, then people
interested in participatory democracy would ask what alternatives exist that
could blend expert technical judgment with opportunities for public involvement
in decisionmaking. Thus the impulse for occasional experiments like the Carter
Administration’s drive for expanded public hearings and television advertising
52
soliciting public comments on regulations, or the more recent use of

50

See Kerwin, supra note ___, at 158 (“The credibility and standing a rule enjoys with those who
will be regulated by it or enjoy the benefits it bestows depend heavily on the accuracy and
completeness of the information on which it is based”).
51
As I have defined it, this “participatory democracy’ strand is potentially consistent with the
resent enthusiasm for deliberative democracy.
See, e.g., JAMES BOHMAN, PUBLIC
DELIBERATION: PLURALISM, COMPLEXITY, AND DEMOCRACY (1996). But the “participatory
democracy” strand does not depend on some sort of deep, slow deliberation as much as on
participation in the process of decisionmaking. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic
Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 248 (2002). Justice Breyer writes:
Serious complex challenges in law are often made in the context of a national
conversation, involving, among others, scientists, engineers, businessmen and –women,
and the media, along with legislators, judges, and many ordinary citizens… That
conversation takes place through many meetings, symposia, and discussions, through
journal articles and media reports, through legislative hearings and court cases.
[Emphasis added].
Justice Breyer’s list could well have included the notice-and-comment process or its close
cousins like negotiated rulemaking. His vision seems to depend less on the notion that people
can participate in the “national conversation,” whether they are scientists or “ordinary citizens.”
52
President Carter issued an executive order directing agencies to explore “holding open
conferences or public hearings” to expand the scope of participation. See Exec. Order 12,044.
The Carter reforms led to increases in the time for comment for many rules, the provision of
advance notice that an agency was considering rulemaking in a certain area, and occasional use
of television and radio advertising soliciting comments. See Kerwin, supra note___, at 169
(discussing Carter-era innovations).
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“deliberative polls” to advise state utility regulators.53 And while direct
democracy may seem ill-suited for some regulatory issues, it certainly seems like
a procedure that imbues a decision with legitimacy.54
The deeper question that arises from this first strand is whether it is
mostly just an aspirational standard -- a philosophical ideal that makes the
administrative state sound benign to people. Despite the Carter reforms and
other occasional experiments, laypeople as a whole hardly seem to have a
persistent interest in regulation or technical sophistication to make meaningful
contributions to particulate emission standards, FCC media ownership rules, or
technical changes in campaign finance law. Even stakeholders trying to
participate – whether they are experts or people more directly affected by a
decision – may be drowned out by the power of organized interests who have
overcome any collective action problems. To the extent that laypeople seem
uninterested and unsophisticated, and unorganized stakeholders appear doomed
to be drowned out by organized interests, then participatory democracy seems
unrealistic at best.
B. The Administrative Pluralism Strand Focuses on the Role of Organized
Interests
There is, nonetheless, a more pragmatic alternative to simply singing the
praises of participatory democracy in the administrative state. A substantial
chunk of the empirical and theoretical research on the administrative state
55
emphasizes the role that interest groups play in shaping regulatory policy. A
lot people have understandably concluded believe that organized interests have
disproportionate power in shaping regulations like the Section 314 rules,
compared to the lay public or to interested individuals or organized groups that
lack organization and political resources. What makes the “administrative
pluralism” strand of thinking about public engagement distinctive is not its
recognition of the role interested parties play its tendency to equate the positive

53

See generally Robert C. Luskin, James Fishkin, & Dennis L. Plane, Deliberative Polling and
Policy Outcomes: Electric Utility Issues in Texas, Paper Presented at Annual Meeting of the
Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management (Nov. 1999) (on file with author)
(describing changes in the opinions of a sample of people asked to consider electric utility
pricing issues in Texas, following the provision of materials to the participants and a chance for
them to deliberate about the issue).
54
See City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
55
There is a vast literature here addressing the role of interest groups in regulatory policy. The
following are a few interesting examples. See, e.g., Terry M. Moe, Control and Feedback in
Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1094 (1985); Mathew D.
McCubbins, The Legislative Design or Regulatory Structure, 29 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 721 (1985);
Randall L. Calvert, Mathew D. McCubbins, and Barry R. Weingast, A Theory of Political
Control and Agency Discretion, 33 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 588 (1989).
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with the normative. Echoing Dahl and other pluralist thinkers,56 proponents of
this view emphasize that interest group competition is probably the best (if not
the only viable) way to integrate the public in complex regulatory and
administrative decisionmaking.57 This is the sort of view that made the early
architects of the Administrative Procedure Act celebrate the fact that – even
before the structure of the modern administrative state had been formalized –
many agencies had realized that their success as regulators depended on
consulting with interested parties that had both a stake in the outcome of the
regulatory process and the requisite expertise to inform that process.58
Some of the positive theory is fairly persuasive.59 The institutions of the
administrative state seem to be politically efficient: they help legislators know
what sort of regulatory policy is being imposed and how the most important
political constituencies will react to the regulations. The existing mechanism for
engaging the public seems perfectly suited to allowing organized interest groups
to participate at various stages in the process: at the time legislation is written in
the first place, later through the notice-and-comment rulemaking process that
applies to most regulatory rules, and then subsequently through litigation and
60
informal efforts to shape agency enforcement policy. The harder question is
56

See, e.g., Robert A. Dahl, American Hybrid, in CLASSIC READINGS IN AMERICAN POLITICS 205,
219 (Pietro S. Nivola & David H. Rosenbloom, eds. 1990) (“I defined the ‘normal’ American
political process as one in which there is a high probability that an activate and legitimate group
in the population can make itself heard effectively at some crucial stage in the process of
decision”). Dahl not only describes interest group competition as a pervasive feature of the
American political system. He also exalts this feature:
[T]he normal American political system… appears to be a relatively efficient system for
reinforcing agreement, encouraging moderation, and maintaining social peace in a
restless and immoderate people operating a gigantic, powerful, diversified and
incredibly complex society. This is no negligible contribution, then, that Americans
have made to the arts of government – and to that branch, which of all the arts of
politics is the most difficult, the art of democratic governance.
Id., at 222.
See, e.g., Edward P. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 711 (2001); Peter H.
Schuck, Against (And For) Madison: An Essay in Praise of Factions, 15 YALE L. & POL. REV.
553, 554 (1997)(“The provision of strong protection for a strongly reviled system of special
interest politics thus appears to be less a paradox than an example, familiar in our system, of a
sound political and constitutional commitment to take some risks and to bear some costs in return
for larger social benefits.”).
58
See FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE 103-04 (1941) (hereinafter, “ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT”). See also Kerwin,
supra note ___, at 158 (noting that the lack of participation from interested parties may result in a
rule “deprived of information that is crucial…”).
59
See infra Part V.a.
60
An advocate of the more ambitious participatory democracy approach might note that the
formal institutions of the administrative state – such as the notice-and-comment process -- are set
up to engage individuals and informal groups, not only interest groups. Rarely if ever does the
law of the administrative explicitly restrict participation to interest groups. On the contrary: in
57
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whether this arrangement is satisfactory in any deeper sense. It’s possible to
state a version of administrative pluralism like this: any degree of participation
in regulatory policy is just fine, as long as agencies fulfill the legal requirements
for issuing regulatory policies. After all, those legal requirements call on
agencies to contend with any serious issue raised in the rulemaking record.61
In contrast, a richer understanding of administrative pluralism would
concern itself with the role that organized interests should play in the whole
enterprise of democracy. An adherent of administrative pluralism must
ultimately believe in the power of groups and organized interests to enrich the
process that serves up the Section 314 rules. To believe in administrative
pluralism, one has to believe to some extent there are no devastating agency
problems in the relationship between interest-group members and leaders. One
must also believe in the social value of allowing competing interests to
contribute their ideas, influence, and distinctive points of view to a regulatory
process that is otherwise primarily driven by expert judgment. While both of
these assumptions are contestable, at least a few things could keep the
administrative pluralism model looking like a pretty desirable approach to
participatory democracy. The agency problems might be assuaged by the fact
that interest groups have to compete for members, and at least a few interests –
such as large corporations, select not-for-profit associations, and highlymotivated individuals – have the options of representing themselves directly.
Either way the agency has to respond to serious concerns. Moreover, while
involvement in the regulatory process by interested parties may raise the specter
of agency “capture,” perhaps the antidote is to be found in competition. Thus,
while individual citizens with diffuse interests may not be able to contribute
much to a regulatory proceeding on air quality, industry and environmental
groups would have the resources to participate with the requisite technical
sophistication. They could challenge each others’ assumptions and provide the
agency with new information, and blow the whistle if the agency neglected an
important aspect of the problem.
Indeed, there might be a few important reasons why this reliance on
organized interests should be perfectly acceptable, at least to some people. One
might think that virtually all the work of the administrative state requires highlymost cases, interest groups get to participate because the individuals they represent would have a
chance to participate – whether because they have the standing to get judicial review or because
the public at large has the power to submit their views during the notice-and-comment period.
What the interest groups are supposed to do is to solve the collective action problems that would
otherwise keep most individuals from following regulatory developments that would have an
effect on them.
61
As one established doctrinal summary of the field put it: “Most remands [of regulatory rules]
are based on a court’s conclusion that the rule is arbitrary and capricious because the agency did
not discuss ‘adequately’ some decisional factor, comment, data dispute, or potential alternative to
the action taken in the rule” RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, AND PAUL R.
VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 334 (1999).
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sophisticated technical expertise anyway, which raises questions about just how
much we achieve by stepping up the involvement of the mass public in
regulatory policy. That’s how courts tend to talk about regulatory policy.62 It
could be that interest groups are the only ones (along with directly interested
parties) with the means and incentives to solve collective action problems to
learn about the issues, organize a response, and otherwise meaningfully take part
in regulatory policymaking. Moreover, the views of interest groups are often in
conflict, so various interests might police each other throughout the regulatory
process – including during the notice-and-comment process. Or at least this is
supposed to be true in the administrative pluralist version of the world.
C. Each Strand Reflects a Theory of Administrative Legitimacy
The preceding approaches to public engagement are more than just
descriptions of what sort of public involvement is supposed to be possible. They
are also theories of legitimacy. No reasonable defender of the administrative
state’s legitimacy has suggested that the public (whether we think of them as
groups or individuals) should be completely screened out of being involved in
regulatory decisions. Nor would such exclusion be politically feasible in a
system like our own.63 But if complete exclusion of the public is neither possible
nor desirable, the question is then how we might expect the public to get
involved in these decisions.
If we look at the existing approach to getting the public involved – with
its expert decisionmaking, and public comment process -- it seems most
consistent with administrative pluralism. Notice-and-comment rulemaking
allows interested parties that solve collective action problems to play a role,
supplementing whatever else they do ex parte and through legislative pressure.
Laypeople may not make sophisticated contributions to rulemaking, but
competing interest groups do so. Expert decisionmaking is considered the key
task of the administrative state by courts and in many cases by the agencies
themselves. And yet intellectually honest observers have to conclude that the
attractiveness of administrative pluralism depends substantially on its empirical
assumptions. Notice that neither these assumptions nor the attractiveness of the
administrative pluralism model itself should be considered in binary terms.
There is some need for subtlety in judging these different strands of thinking
about participation in the administrative state. Nonetheless, if the intuitions
62

See, e.g., Pattern Makers’ League of North America, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 115
(1985) (upholding agency decision regarding an unfair labor practice because the “Board has the
primary responsibility for applying ‘the general provisions of the Act to the complexities of
industrial life’”); National Rifle Ass’n v. Reno, 216 F.3d 122, 134 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (affirming
dismissal of a complaint against a Justice Department practice of creating a temporary audit log
of gun purchasers, on the ground that “it is the agencies, not the courts, that have the technical
expertise… to carry out statutory mandates”).
63
See Part V.b, infra.
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listed above turned out to be wrong, it would be harder to defend the
administrative pluralism strand – which would then suggest the need to
rethinking how the administrative state achieves public engagement.
One might thus group the potential problems with this second strand into
two categories. First, how persuasive are the underlying assumptions of the
second strand? Even if these turn out to be relatively convincing, how
persuasive is the underlying interest-group centered vision of democracy that is
implied by the administrative pluralism approach? We can get a better sense of
how these assumptions fare if we turn to a specific case study. Since the case
study may seem to raise issues that are less commonly seen in administrative law
(i.e., law enforcement, national security, the war on terrorism), I also spend a
little time placing the case study in context and trying to show why the problems
raised in the case study are not as unique as they might seem.
II.
A CASE STUDY HIGHLIGHTS SOME LIMITATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE PLURALISM
In this Part, I examine the questions raised by the two strands of thinking
about public engagement in light of the experience with Section 314. To do this,
I place Section 314 in the broader context of scholarship on the reality of the
regulatory process. I then consider how the experiences with regulatory policy
conform to the implicit intuitions of the administrative pluralism model, which
implies, for example, that concerns raised in the comments will be addressed and
that sophisticated interest groups will articulate the concerns that should be
relevant to the regulatory process. This exercise shows that the intuitions
supporting the administrative pluralism model turn out to be rather shaky. The
results are revealing: though the number of comments was small (172), the vast
majority (over 70%) came from unsophisticated laypeople concerned about
privacy. The agency appears to have ignored these, instead lavishing attention
on sophisticated comments from businesses and their representatives.
A. Section 314 Caused Regulators to Revise Law Enforcement Power to
Obtain Private Financial Information
I chose this case study because the rule is one that applies to virtually
anyone in the country, because the issue in question is timely and obviously
requires balancing various competing values, and because the statute gives the
agency a lot of latitude with the rule. Although regulatory rulemaking
proceedings involving law enforcement and national security may seem at first
to raise unique issues, below I try to show how the case study sheds light on all
of administrative law. Where there may be important differences in terms of
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relevance to the questions, I have noted them. The appendix describes the
methods I used to analyze the relevant comments.
i. The problem and the statute
Growing fears of crime and terrorism among legislators and the public
provoke a sense of urgency about law enforcement. That urgency extends to
both (ex ante) preventive investigation and (ex post) prosecution. Financial data
are definitely useful in after-the-fact enforcement, where prosecutors must
establish the elements of various offenses and prove their theory of the case, and
is probably also somewhat useful in preventive investigation.64 But before
September 11, the question of government access to financial information for
national security or criminal enforcement purposes created some frustration for
law enforcement officials. Sometimes law enforcement investigators working on
ex post enforcement had a hard time actually getting the records of people who
were being investigated, because defendants did not always tell authorities where
they had accounts. It was harder still to get access to financial records of
suspects: that required a judicial subpoena, which in turn required authorities to
figure out where their suspect engaged in financial activity and (in most cases)
required persons whose records were targeted to receive notice and have a
65
chance to oppose the subpoena in court.
Meanwhile, some financial institutions insisted that they did not know
what (if any) information they could share with other financial institutions
regarding people they considered suspicious, or whether they could act on such
information (for example) to close the accounts of suspicious people. One might
wonder why such institutions would be interested in sharing information at all.
One possibility is that the prospects of subsequent government investigations
leading to possible civil or criminal liability, coupled with the potential for bad
publicity, might give rise to such pressures. Although the Suspicious Activity
Reporting (SAR) system already had its own safe harbor provision, there were
still questions about a financial institutions civil or criminal liability if it
accepted business that had raised red flags at other financial institutions.
Moreover, there was the slight chance that taking on a customer who turned out
to be using her bank account to engage in criminal financial activity of some
kind would lead to public embarrassment.
For all these pre-September 11 frustrations in using financial data to
advance law enforcement goals, the executive branch could take at least small
steps to address these concerns. It could use computers to analyze currency
64

In other work I chronicle how law enforcers tend to use financial records for ex post rather than
ex ante (i.e., preventive) enforcement, despite the official insistence that financial records are
useful for both . See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The Tenuous Relationship Between the Fight
Against Money Laundering and the Disruption of Criminal Finance, 93 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 311 (2003).
65
See infra notes___.
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transaction records collected subject to existing regulatory authorities – but
these provide only a tiny snapshot of the aggregate financial transactions in the
country, the vast majority of which do not involve physical currency. Law
enforcement bureaucracies could also try to expedite the process for obtaining
judicial subpoenas for financial records of suspected criminals. If law
enforcement agents knew where a suspect kept accounts and had enough
suspicion, then they could obtain a judicial subpoena for her records.66 But there
was no enactment of broad statutory authority allowing some regulatory agency
to prescribe uniform rules governing the mass dissemination of a request to all
(or most) financial institutions in the country.67 Doing a nationwide subpoena
was questionable at best, on both legal and practical grounds.68 In fact, efforts to
streamline this sort of activity raised some warning flags for politicians and
outside interest groups. For example, while financial institutions might be
interested in further expanding the scope of their safe harbors (so they would not
have to face liability if they voluntarily chose to share information), they were
certainly not interested in being saddled with further legal obligations to provide
records to government.
The September 11 attacks precipitated a staggering burst of legislative
activity. Many legislative changes involving law enforcement and national
security became possible that had previously not been politically-feasible.
September 11 even dramatized the potential costs that could be faced by a
private-sector entity thought to be unwittingly responsible for the tragedy, which
probably heightened financial institutions’ interest in sharing information and
66

Under the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401 et seq. (hereinafter, “RFPA”),
such a subpoena would ordinarily give notification to the person whose records are requested, as
well as a chance to fight the subpoena in court. See generally Laura N. Pringle and Conni L.
Allen, Privacy and Related Issues for Financial Institutions and Other Regulated Entities, 53
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 28 (1999).
67
The impact of such a rule obviously depends on how broadly one defines “financial
institution.” Although this may seem like a straightforward matter, even the original Bank
Secrecy Act gives Treasury wide latitude over how to define a financial institution. See Bank
Secrecy Act (hereinafter “BSA”), 31 U.S.C.A. § 5312. The statute gives Treasury the power to
define “financial institution” to include, among other entities, commercial banks and trust
companies, private banks, branches of foreign banks in the U.S., investment bankers, insurance
companies, travel agencies, licensed money transmitters, casinos, or:
any business or agency which engages in any activity which the Secretary of the
Treasury determines, by regulation, to be an activity which is similar to, related to, or a
substitute for any activity in which any business described in this paragraph is
authorized to engage; or any other business designated by the Secretary whose cash
transactions have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory matters.
68

Before 2002, there was no nationwide system allowing law enforcement agencies to
communicate a request for records to all financial institutions in the country, nor any legal
requirement that financial institutions cooperate with law enforcement authorities in searching
their records for information. On the contrary, RFPA established notable restrictions on the
disclosure of any such information.

RETHINKING PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT
23
otherwise minimizing the probability that they might turn out to be Osama bin
Laden’s personal banker. Financial institutions that had previously opposed
expanding government request powers might now find it difficult to be
completely opposed to this (given how popular the USA Patriot Act would be),
but if the legislation provided for broad authority to be exercised by regulators,
then they had another chance to shape the actual enforcement consequences of
the statute. And so we end up with the USAPA, and its Section 314.
What Section 314 does is to give the Treasury Department the authority
to encourage information sharing between financial institutions and the federal
government, and among different financial institutions.
Section 314(a)
establishes authority for Treasury to create rules for the request and sharing of
financial information between financial institutions and law enforcement.69
Specifically, Section 314(a)(1) provides in part that:
[T]he Secretary shall… adopt regulations to encourage further
cooperation among financial institutions, their regulatory authorities, and
law enforcement authorities, with the specific purpose of encouraging
regulatory authorities and law enforcement authorities to share with
financial institutions information regarding individuals, entities, and
organizations engaged in or reasonably suspected based on credible
70
evidence of engaging in terrorist acts or money laundering activities.
A fuller picture emerges when we consider what Section 314(a)(2)(C) states:
[The regulations may] include or create procedures for cooperation and
information focusing on…. Means of facilitating the identification of
accounts and transactions involving terrorist groups and facilitating the
exchange of information concerning such accounts and transactions
between financial institutions and law enforcement organizations.71
While subsection (a) addresses the link between financial institutions and
federal authorities, Section 314(b) directs Treasury to develop rules for the
sharing of information among financial institutions in the interest of preventing
money laundering or terrorist financing.72 Under the statute, the regulations can

69

See USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56 (USAPA). Section 314 of the Act is an
uncodified provision that appears in the Historical and Statutory Notes to 31 U.S.C. 5311.
Section 5311 is part of the BSA, and regulations implementing it appear at 31 CFR part 103.
Since the authority of the Treasury Secretary to administer the BSA has been delegated to the
Director of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), then FinCEN has
responsibility for developing the regulations under Section 314.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
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allow such information-sharing to take place pursuant to a safe-harbor from
legal liability for the institutions sharing the information. It provides:
Upon notice provided to the Secretary, 2 or more financial institutions
and any association of financial institutions may share information with
one another regarding individuals, entities, organizations, and countries
suspected of possible terrorist or money laundering activities. A
financial institution or association that transmits, receives, or shares such
information for the purposes of identifying and reporting activities shall
not be liable to any person under any law or regulation of the United
States, any constitution, law, or regulation of any State or political
subdivision thereof, or under any contract or other legally enforceable
agreement (including any arbitration agreement), for such disclosure or
for any failure to provide notice of such disclosure, or any other person
identified in the disclosure, except where such transmission, receipt, or
sharing violates this section or regulations promulgated pursuant to this
section.
The potential impact of Section 314(a) starts to emerge clearly if we
think about the rules affecting how federal agents could get their hands on
records before the legislation. For the most part, they had to use a subpoena,
which meant federal law enforcement agents needed at least some ex ante
suspicions about where the suspected wrongdoer might have her records. The
latter could then be challenged in court, and the Right to Financial Privacy Act
73
further provides for the challenge of a request for financial records. In contrast,
Section 314(a) could make it easier for law enforcement to get information from
any bank in the country. That authority might be restricted to instances where
law enforcement bureaucracies certify that the person whose records they want is
credibly thought to be engaging in money laundering or terrorism,74 but the
statute does not provide any remedy for a failure in the law enforcement
73

The Right to Financial Privacy Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422, previously restricted financial
institutions from disclosing a person’s financial information to the government unless the records
were disclosed pursuant to a subpoena or a search warrant. Depending on the details of the
regulations implementing Section 314(a), then, federal officials might easily sidestep the existing
restrictions on information disclosure in the RFPA.
74
Section 314(a)(1) explicitly notes that information sharing should only cover people on
“individuals, entities, and organizations engaged in or reasonably suspected based on credible
evidence of engaging in terrorist acts or money laundering activities.” Section 314(2) states that
information sharing procedures may focus on “matters specifically related to the finances of
terrorist groups” (Section 314(2)(A)); “the relationship… between international narcotics
traffickers and foreign terrorist organizations…” (Section 314(2)(B)); or “accounts and
transactions involving terrorist groups.” Although someone might argue about the precise extent
of the preceding list’s restrictions on information disclosure, the most plausible explanation for
why those apparent limits are in the statute is that legislators wanted to restrict the scope of
disclosed financial information.
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certification process.75 In short, Section 314(a) at least authorizes the creation
of a simple means for law enforcement agents to “tell” banks what accounts to
scrutinize with particular care. The payoff from this may be specific
information, but also an implicit signal to financial institutions about whom they
should scrutinize carefully.
If sharing information with government is valuable, presumably so too is
sharing of information among private sector financial institutions. In a nutshell,
Section 314(b) gives Treasury the regulatory authority to set up a system for
financial institutions to share information among themselves.76 How much they
actually do that obviously depends on their incentives. But in a world where the
potential penalty for unwittingly providing a haven for terrorist or criminal
financial transactions may include not only a fine but also public disapproval,
one might imagine that financial institutions might be interested in sharing
information to minimize the risk of fallout. Such motivations might be patriotic
or simply a means of minimizing economic and political costs. Either way,
those motivations have to be adjusted for the risk of liability that a financial
institution might face by disclosing financial information that would otherwise
be private. Thus we might expect financial institutions to do whatever possible
to avoid being caught between government policies encouraging the sharing of
information and potential liability to customers for having disclosed the
information.
But if one is not going to be economically impacted by Section 314, why
spend any time thinking about it at all? Consider a few reasons why members of
the public might be quite interested. Section 314 is part of a trend reducing the
barriers faced by government to obtain information, which triggers what are
commonly referred to as “civil liberties” concerns. Some of those concerns are
about privacy. Some are about false positives, including the concerns of people
whose allegedly suspicious behavior might prompt many banks to deny them
services. Other concerns might arise from the fear of surveillance and
harassment on the basis of improper motives, or unwarranted enforcement
patterns, in which case the alleged harm isn’t just that someone who works for
75

Cf. Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 2277 (2002). Gonzaga
concerned the privacy interests that people claimed under the Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g. A former university student sued under Section 1983, alleging
that the university had violated his rights under the statute. The Court held that, absent specific
“rights-creating” language, a statute did not create an right enforceable under Section 1983 (or
through an implied right of action). See id. at 2275. Even if the statute includes “rights creating”
language, the plaintiff must show Congress also intended to create a “private remedy.” Id. at
2276. There might be a theory under which a sufficiently egregious bad faith violation of the
details of Section 314(a)’s limitations might give rise to a constitutional tort. But that’s at the
extreme, and in any case it would be difficult for anyone aggrieved to discover the facts
necessary to make out such a claim (under Bivens). Anything short of that would have to be
resolved by a remedy created through the statute (which does not provide for a remedy) or the
regulation (which could).
76
See Section 314(b), supra note 72.
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the government can get her eyeballs on where someone’s transferred money,
but that the information can lead to enforcement patterns that might be troubling.
Still other problems might involve the so-called “slippery slope,” a dynamic that
can link Section 314 to more ominous and protracted legal changes.77 It is also
plausible that Section 314 and measures like it allow the government to improve
its capacity to deter offenses, because it would allow the government to more
easily ascertain how much money people have – and such money could subject
to confiscation.
In addition, Section 314 could interact with other legal provisions and
bureaucratic practices that might shape how law enforcement functions. This
might be good or bad depending on one’s underlying concerns about law
enforcement. On the one hand, if law enforcement can do more things to people
on the basis of suspicion with less judicial review, then perhaps there is more
reason to be concerned about law enforcement access to records that can spark
suspicion. Regardless of whether the initial suspicion was about terrorism or
money laundering (as the statute requires, in principle), any criminal violation
can be charged once it’s discovered.78 On the other hand, given a steady and
substantial demand for enforcement performance, different detection strategies
can be substitutes for each other. This raises the possibility that financial
surveillance (to pick one example) might be a substitute for techniques such as
preventive detention, voice communication wiretaps, or physical dragnets.
Whether this is good or bad depends on one’s outlook. How then did the agency
treat these different kinds of issues?
ii. The proposed regulation
Notice the scope of flexibility that Section 314 leaves the agency. It
directs the agency to consider law enforcement and national security benefits but
also gives it explicit commands to limit the scope of information made available
to that which pertains to people reasonably believed to be terrorists (including
their financial supporters) or money launderers. Though the statute does not
mention privacy in so many words, it does indicate that the power granted to law
enforcement to request or share information is under restrictions. The larger
statutory framework obviously evinces a concern with privacy and non79
arbitrariness.
77

See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026
(2003).
78
See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
79
For example, although Section 314(b) provides a safe harbor for financial institutions sharing
information, it restricts the uses of the information provided and prohibits it from being
disclosed. The rest of USAPA also makes some concessions to privacy. For example, regarding
USAPA’s concern with privacy in the context of electronic surveillance, see, e.g., Orin Kerr,
Internet Surveillance Law After the USA PATRIOT ACT: The Big Brother That Isn’t, 97 NW. U.
LAW REV. 607 (2003). Obviously this does not mean the statute is what civil libertarians would
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The initial draft regulations took the statutory mandate to “encourage”
cooperation and mostly turned it into a mechanism for getting information to law
enforcement. The proposal regulations had two major features. First, they
would facilitate blanket, nationwide law enforcement queries to financial
institutions regarding account information of people suspected of being involved
in money laundering and terrorist financing.80 Upon finding the records of the
person in question, the financial institution would have to turn over any
information gleaned from the customer when the account was established, and
information about transactions made through the account.81 Information requests
82
could therefore become quite routine. Not that the customer whose requests
would ever know that, because the regulations forbid the requested financial
institution from communicating the request with the customer. What the
financial institution can do is use the information to make a number of decisions
on its own, such as deciding not to offer baking services to a person. This could
turn the provisions of part 103.100 into something like a warning to financial
institutions not to offer services to someone. Second, although law enforcement
authorities must certify that all persons whose account information is requested
are suspects of terrorism or money laundering, there is no obvious remedy for
any violation. As observed earlier, there is no constitutional expectation of
privacy in records held by a third party. This means FinCEN and law
like. But neither can one assume that the statute reflects no concern about privacy. Section 314
is therefore just one example where the regulatory agency charged with developing rules about
USAPA’s provisions could conceivably consider privacy and civil liberties concerns.
80
See Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Special Information Sharing Procedures to Deter
Money Laundering and Terrorist Activity, 67 FED. REG. 9879, avail. at 2002 WL 331533(FR)
(March 4, 2002) (hereinafter “Section 314 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking”).
81
Id.
82
See id. at 9884. Specifically, proposed Section 103.100 provides in relevant part as follows:
(b) Requests for information relating to money laundering or terrorist activities. On
behalf of a federal law enforcement agency investigating money laundering or terrorist
activity, FinCEN may require any financial institution to search its records to determine
whether the financial institution maintains or has maintained accounts for, or has
engaged in transactions with, any specified individual, entity, or organization.
(c) Certification requirement. Prior to FinCEN requesting information… the federal law
enforcement agency shall provide FinCEN with a written certification… that each
individual, entity, or organization about which the agency is seeking information is
engaged in, or reasonably suspected based on credible evidence of engaging in, money
laundering or terrorist activity.
No additional certification is required from federal law enforcement agencies, nor do the
regulations establish any procedures to audit the extent to which law enforcement agencies have
a basis for suspecting the individuals, entities, or organizations in question. Subsequent portions
of the proposed Section 103.100 provide that the financial institution must provide FinCEN with,
among other things, all identifying information used by the account holder to establish the
account, and information involving transactions connected to the account. Id.
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enforcement agencies must police themselves when it comes to the limits of the
justification for information requests. The absence of a remedy means no one
else will have much of a chance to discipline anyone in government who abuses
Section 103.100 by making unjustified requests for information.83
Meanwhile, Part 103.110 of the draft regulation established the rule
implementing Section 314(b). The regulations establish a legal safe harbor for
many different types of financial institutions to share information among
themselves relating to suspected money laundering or terrorist activity.84 To
avail themselves of the safe-harbor under the proposed regulation, financial
institutions had to “certify” to FinCEN that they were going to engage in
information sharing and that they would not use the information improperly.85
iii. The resulting regulation
86
Then came the required comment period, after which the final
regulations were published in the Federal Register. The revised regulations
looked a lot like the original ones. But they involved four major changes:

1. The regulations (especially 103.100) were reorganized for clarity.
Specifically, financial institutions’ obligations to provide information
87
under Section 314 are now grouped in a single paragraph.
2. The regulations added some default rules restricting the scope of what a
financial institution would have to provide when receiving a request from
the government, unless a request specifically provides otherwise.88 There
are two default rules. One default rule says a financial institution only
needs to search its records for current accounts or accounts held during
the last twelve months, or transactions taking place during the preceding
83

See supra note 75(discussing Gonzaga). Note that in Gonzaga, the presumption of a remedy
would have been even stronger since the alleged violation of the Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act (FERPA) was committed by a state government, thereby making § 1983 applicable
at least in principle. Since that would not be applicable here, then the only remaining route is a
Bivens action.
84
See Section 314 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, at 9885. The Section 103.110 proposal
states, in relevant part that:
…[a] financial institution or association of financial institutions that engages in the
sharing of nformation pursuant to this section shall not be liable to any person under any
law or regulation of the United States, under any constitution, law, or regulation of any
State or political subdivision thereof, or under any contract or other legally enforceable
agreement…
85

Id.
See APA § 553 et seq.
87
See , Section 314 Final Rule Statement, supra note __, at 60580.
88
Id.
86
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six months. Another default rule says that financial institutions need not
report a customer’s future activity unless the information request from
law enforcement (emanating through FinCEN) specifically asks for such
future information.89
3. The final regulations also expand the kinds of financial institutions that
90
The new
can share information and avoid liability for doing so.
regulation encompasses all financial institutions that are required to
maintain an “anti-money laundering” program (which turns out to be a
lot more than, for example, commercial banks), unless FinCEN
specifically “determines that a particular category of financial institution
should not be eligible to share information under this provision.
4. The final regulations streamline the certification process, through which
financial institutions opt-in to the information-sharing program.91 Under
the final regulation, the requirement is simply that financial institutions
provide FinCEN with notice that they will be engaged in information
sharing (and there is no way to revoke this), and that they make
reasonable efforts to establish if a financial institution with which they
are sharing information has also given FinCEN adequate notice.
One could argue that all of these changes seem like improvements over
the initial rule, at least according to a defensible standard of administrability.
Regrouping the financial institutions’ obligations in a single paragraph may be a
small thing but it probably makes the regulation easier to read. The use of
default rules is a more meaningful step for financial institutions – and law
enforcement authorities do not lose the ability to ask financial institutions to
make longer-term searches or report on future activity. And if sharing
information among institutions is supposed to improve security, then surely it is
plausible to expand the scope of the “financial institutions” that can take
advantage of the safe harbor. FinCEN’s own explanations in the Federal
Register discuss why these changes are justified, and credits particular comments
for illuminating the need for the various changes.92 What is more, some of the
comments were specifically seeking the sorts of changes that FinCEN made in
the rule.93
B. The Administrative Pluralism Model Should be Assessed in Light of the Case
Study and Some Fundamental Questions
89

Id. Note that this means the regulations imply that law enforcement may use FinCEN to make
a request for future information, because a default nature by its own terms can be altered.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 60580-82.
93
Id. at 60580.
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Now let’s return to some of the questions I posed above regarding
administrative pluralism and the interest-group focused approach to public
engagement that it supports. My assumption here is that administrative
pluralism requires a qualitative evaluation. The answers to certain questions
may shed light on the implicit claims of the administrative pluralism model –
particularly the claim that it is the only reasonable approach to participatory
democracy in the administrative state.
i. How pervasive is the role of technical and scientific decisionmaking in
the administrative state?
Routine regulatory problems resolved through rulemaking involve
complex judgments about risk and value that probably benefit from expertise,
but they also involve policy judgments that often reflect ambiguous statutory
commands. Sometimes judges explicitly recognize the importance of policy
judgments but note that the agency should make them because is rendered
accountable through representative politics (in keeping with the administrative
pluralism model).94 But most of the time courts defer to agencies, invoking
expertise and institutional competence as justification. Commentators have long
raised questions about this claim, though lately some scholarly voices have
sought to defend the idea of expertise by noting that laypeople have a tendency
95
not to make sound judgments about risk. Still, there is something unsatisfying
about the narrow claim that the heavy lifting done by the administrative state
when it regulates is predominantly about expertise. Let me illustrate this first
with Section 314, and then with examples from other regulatory contexts.
Specifically, privacy and related concerns – like many other issues
entrusted to regulators – turn out not to be pure technical matters under almost
any defensible definition. Even if one assumed that the law enforcement interest
at issue in the Section 314 regulations should be treated as the exclusive domain
of experts (a questionable assumption), there is almost no way of describing
privacy concerns as the exclusive domain for experts. It is true that the statute
clearly emphasizes the goal of encouraging the sharing of information about
suspected terrorists or money launderers, yet the statute also commands that
sharing should be limited. Both the nature of that limit, the rest of the USAPA
statute, and the underlying APA notice-and-comment process suggest that the
agency is supposed to strike a balance between several different issues.96 One
94

See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 403 U.S. 29, 59 (1983)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (recognizing the impact of partisan
changes on the administration of agency programs)(hereinafter “State Farm”).
95
See Sunstein, Risk and Reason, supra note___, at ___.
96
Cf. Industrial Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst. (Benzene) 448 U.S. 607,
646-48 (1980) (plurality opinion) (OSHA statute, if interpreted appropriately to cure
constitutional defects, creates a list of factors that the agency must consider in creating a
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goal, obviously, is advancing national security and law enforcement objectives.
Treating this as a matter for experts to resolve is certainly plausible, though not
obviously right.97 And whatever one thinks of the idea that national security and
law enforcement can be treated as ripe for technical resolution by experts, the
remaining concerns implicit in the statute are about privacy and accountability
for the use of sensitive information.98 Presumably, this is why there are some
restrictions on the use of the financial information by the government and
financial institutions.
Some might argue that any concern involved in regulatory policy reduces
to a question of risks of particular states of the world. Seen in this light, the
concern over privacy evinced by Section 314 is nothing more than an awareness
of the risk that the government will abuse its access to financial information.
This way of thinking again turns all of regulatory policy into the anodyne task
for a technocratic expert. It is true that any policy question might in principle
reduce to a matter of expected utility, but it is not clear how this cuts. Agency
officials have to think about expected utility when they make decisions, and so
does everyone else. But expected utility is about the value assigned to a state of
regulation that is not arbitrary and capricious). (emphasizing the importance of the agency
balancing several competing concerns).
97
The question is in part whether people likely to be called on as experts in the field (i.e., law
enforcers) are in a position to provide accurate information about what legal changes are needed.
This raises at least two different kinds of problems. One is the quality of information and
analysis that experts on national security and law enforcement can provide. Another is an agency
problem: given that law enforcers, like anyone else, have interests and respond to incentives,
there may be distoritions created when they serve both as experts and also beneficiaries of
particular legal changes. See Cuéllar, supra note 27.
98
For example, one commenter had the following to say:
I oppose all regulations of the Patriot Act proposed by the Treasury Department. This
act will do nothing to prevent terrorism and will only result in further losses of freedom
and privacy for honest, law-abiding Americans. The proposed Act is unconstitutional;
the Administration and Congress will be violating their oaths to uphold the US
Constitution if they agree to pass this or any similar legislation. I hope my government
still listens to its citizens and I have not wasted my time in stringently and in all ways
OPPOSING THIS PROPOSED LEGISLATION. Thank you for doing what is highest
and best for all Americans.
Section 314 Comments, supra note___, Comment # 124. Another said this:
Banks already ignore the Privacy Act and illegally discriminate against people who do
not use a Slave Surveillance Number (SSN)[sic]. I am opposed to your so-called
“Patriot Act” and any other police state tactics you dream up.
Id., Comment # 63. The Appendix, supra, lists excerpts from additional comments.
This is a far cry from a sophisticated argument to the effect that the agency should minimize the
damage done by Miller by narrowing the scope of law enforcement authority. But the preceding
commenters would probably agree with the existing statement if given an explanation (and if she
did not believe that all was lost in any event).
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the world, not just its probability. If a citizen chose to be concerned about the
Section 314 regulations and an agency official was not concerned, their
difference of opinion may have nothing to do with their different estimates of the
probability of abuse, but from a different guess about the cost they would bear if
100 people knew that the citizen was sending money to a drug treatment center.
Moreover, even if the citizen and the agency official began with the same
valuation of the scenario, the government official might be desensitized from
repeatedly being exposed to private information.99
The regulations at issue in Rust v. Sullivan100 provide another example of
how there is much more to the administrative state than scientific technocracy.
The question was whether – and how – the federal Department of Health and
Human Services could apply a gag rule limiting abortion-related counseling in
federally-funded clinics. While the court made some moves in the direction of
acknowledging ideological differences in how a Republican administration
would treat the issue, the major thrust of the argument for deference to the
agency was expertise and reference to “reasoned analysis”:
At no time did Congress directly address the issues of abortion
counseling, referral, or advocacy. The parties’ attempts to characterize
highly generalized, conflicting statements in the legislative history into
accurate revelations of congressional intent are unavailing. When we
find, as we do here, that the legislative history is ambiguous and
unenlightening on the matters with respect to which the regulations deal,
101
we customarily defer to the expertise of the agency.
Technical and scientific knowledge probably matters some to this decision. But
only the most expansive definition of expert would let one just call the decision
“science.”102
99

One could think of the existing administrative process and all its political checks as a way to
address the regulatory issues that should not be left to the experts. But, as Section 314 also
makes clear, not every commenter with a morsel of information about the regulation’s policy
implications manages to provide sophisticated input. Not only does this lack of sophistication
make it harder for a willing agency to assimilate contributions from many members of the public
who do take the trouble to provide their comments. A teeming mass of unsophisticated
comments is also likely to reinforce the idea that nothing will happen if the agency ignores the
comments from laypeople.
100
500 U.S. 173 (1991).
101
500 U.S. at 185-86.
102
And the bigger the concept of expertise, the more it makes sense to remember James Q.
Wilson’s admonition about it. In discussing the politics of bureaucracy, Wilson wrote:
What the statute left vague “experts” were to imbue with meaning. But expert opinion
changes and some experts in fact are politicians who bow to the influence of organized
interests or ideologues who embrace the enthusiasms of zealous factions.
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Even the rarefied domain of environmental regulation involves, at best,
a mix of scientific and policy determinations. Consider the Environmental
Protection Agency’s recent rules governing the concentration of arsenic in
drinking water promulgated under the Safe Drinking Water Act.103 One study
critiqued the final rule, alleging that the regulator was insufficiently attentive to
technical economic and scientific concerns.104 Another scholarly commentator
defended the rule, suggesting it was not the product of shoddy analysis but
instead the result of legitimate judgment calls.105 According to this commentator,
the agency issued a reasonable rule reflecting a legitimate interpretation of
106
conflicting data from wage-premium studies and attention to the need for an
107
adequate margin of safety. It is a separate question to ask whether the larger
public would care or understand the debate between the two positions described
above – a question I take up below – but the disagreement is obviously not just
about science. It is about the type of inference to draw from an imperfect wagepremium study, and even more so about whether there is a need for an adequate
margin of safety in a regulation designed to reduce a potentially dangerous
108
concentration of arsenic.
I could go on, but the point should be clear. Of course agencies are
expected to use rigorous analytical tools to weigh the risk of environmental,
health-related, security, or occupational risks, depending on their mandate. What
such analysis depends on are questions such as how to interpret an ambiguous
WILSON, supra note 43, at 330.
103
Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (2000).
104
See Jason K. Burnett & Robert W. Hahn, EPA’s Arsenic Rule: The Benefits of the Standard
Do Not Justify the Costs (2001), avail. at http://aei.brookings.org/admin/pdffiles/ reg_analysis_
01_02.pdf.
105
See Thomas O. McGarity, Professor Sunstein’s Fuzzy Math, 90 GEO. L.J. 2341 (2002).
106
Id. at 2355. Professor McGarity writes:
[It is] certainly correct to emphasize that existing wage premium studies produce a very
wide distribution of estimates and that they surely do not encompass every
consideration that should go into monetizing the value of a statistical life. Whether
these problems are cured [as the Burnett and Hahn study implies] by picking a number
in the middle of the range of peer reviewed studies, multiplying that number by four
because another law professor thought that was a sensible way to account for a few of
the neglected considerations, and boosting that number by an additional twenty-three
percent because rich people assign a higher monetary value to their lives than modest
wage earners do is certainly an open question.
107

Id. at 2375. The article notes:

How many of us want to drive over a bridge or ride in an airplane for which the last
dollar spent on safety just equaled the projected monetized lives saved discounted to
present value? A margin of safety provides a backup level of safety as a hedge against
catastrophe when experts turn out to be wrong.
108
I am not suggesting that one can dispense with expert decisionmaking in determining (a)
exactly what amounts to a “dangerous concentration” of arsenic, (b)
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statute (not just ambiguous facts), or how to make judgment calls about the
value of particular outcomes (not just their probability). Unless one defines
technical expertise or science in a way that explicitly includes political
judgments, it is not plausible to treat all regulatory policy issues as being
primarily about expert or scientific decisionmaking. Obviously expert
decisionmaking has a role sculpting regulations about domestic security and
financial privacy. And sometimes statutes appear to call almost exclusively for
scientific and technical determinations.109 Regulatory policy aims to affect
complicated problems that are often not easily understood or explained. But the
administrative pluralism model seems to confuse two ideas. One is that
regulatory decisions are primarily about expert judgment. The other is that view
that most regulatory decisions involve contestable legal interpretations and
policy judgments, both of which should be informed by technical and scientific
expertise. There is a difference. In one approach the experts are assumed to be
the ideal decisionmakers, and the rest of the regulatory process is meant only to
assure they do not run amok with the public trust. In the other approach the
110
experts are viewed as being in a secondary, albeit valuable, role. Amidst the
administrative pluralism model of public engagement and the nondelegation
doctrine’s implicit focus on technical and scientific expertise, something gets
lost in the shuffle. What gets lost is the idea that statutory interpretation in the
course of writing regulations involves value choices as much as technical and
scientific knowledge.
ii. Do interested parties provide sophisticated comments covering the
major issues in a rulemaking proceeding?
The administrative pluralism strand would seem more satisfying if it
turns out that clusters of interested parties gather round an agency during a
difficult rulemaking proceeding to help it seriously consider a broad range of
viewpoints when making regulatory policy decisions. The implication of this
image is that interested parties who submit comments and play a role in shaping
regulatory policy will represent an array of concerns, including those that would
likely be important to various different constituencies subject to the regulation.
But this was not the case with the Section 314 regulations. Not a single
organized interest group concerned about privacy or civil liberties participated in
111
the notice-and-comment process.
109

See, e.g., See Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457, 472-73 (2001)
(hereinafter “American Trucking”) (interpreting the Clean Air Act to require exclusively a
technical determination of what constitutes an adequate air quality standard to protect “public
health”).
110
Thus, adherents to the second approach are not surprised to find that agency administrators are
rarely apolitical technical experts.
111
Neither is there any evidence to indicate that such groups participated through ex parte
communications with the agency outside the context of the notice-and-comment process. The
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It would be hard to argue that privacy was irrelevant to what the agency
was doing with Section 314. Few people would be indifferent if unauthorized
third parties had access to their private financial information. Thanks to Section
314 and the attendant regulations, what had been difficult for the government to
obtain became relatively easy to get. Despite the fact that privacy is important
both as a legal and a policy matter, there was no participation from any mass
membership or advocacy organization with a sophisticated capacity for legal
capacity and concerned specifically about privacy. Perhaps it is not surprising
that such organizations may have too few resources to participate in rulemaking
proceedings like this in times of crisis, when the pace of legal change quickens.112
Whatever the cause, there were no sophisticated interest groups urging the
agency to weigh the purported benefits of Section 314 against the perceived or
actual privacy costs.
Of course it is true that we may not be able to generalize the Section 314
example to every situation. Interest groups and mass membership organizations
representing a broad array of viewpoints often take part in regulatory
proceedings through comments or ex parte contacts with regulatory agencies.
Nonetheless, a substantial percentage of rules do not generate any comments at
113
all, and many interest groups consider participation in rulemaking less
important than litigation, or making political contributions.114 The experience
with Section 314 shows that this process cannot guarantee that sophisticated
advocates will articulate the full range of concerns that someone might
defensibly consider important.115 The larger question is what it means for the
agency did not mention any such consultations in its discussion of the proposed or the final rule
in the Federal Register, nor did it discuss the underlying (privacy and civil liberties) concerns
that such groups would have presumably raised.
112
If Section 314 regulations were being crafted at a time of meager legal changes affecting
privacy or civil liberties, it is quite likely that the usual suspects – organizations like the
American Civil Liberties Union or the Electronic Frontier Foundation – would have commented.
113
See Kerwin, supra note ___, at 185 (evaluating a sample of rules issued between January and
June 1991, and finding that only about 60% of rules with prior notice generated any public
comments).
114
Id. at 187 (62% of interest groups surveyed consider political contributions somewhat or far
more important than participation in rulemaking, and 60% reach the same conclusion about
litigation), and 194 (only 53% of groups surveyed “always” use written comments to influence
the regulatory process). One might interpret this as a “market” response of interest groups
choosing to allocate their resources elsewhere. Cf. John M. de Figueiredo and Rui J. P. de
Figueiredo, Jr., The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation and
Administrative Regulation, unpublished paper on file with author (2002). But interest groups
may have their own reasons to focus their resources away from influencing policy – and these
may not match the interests of the members. See Moe, supra note___, at ___ (“…interest
group… policymaking processes can only be understood by taking into account the close
interconnection of internal politics and the structural determinations of formation and
maintenance.”).
115
The evidence here is not enough to establish whether the interest group process yields such
systematic failures in other contexts. But neither can we reliably conclude that Section 314 is a
complete aberration.
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interests of leaders of advocacy groups to be aligned with those of their
members, or even more broadly, with those of the various “publics” that they are
taken to represent.
iii. Do laypeople participate in regulatory proceedings?
Although the administrative pluralism approach plays down the
possibility that masses of individual laypeople would be rushing to write in
comments about proposed rules, their participation might still be quite valuable
under the model. In principle, individual citizens or members of informal
associations could help cover any concerns not addressed by interest groups.
But do such people participate?
It turns out that 172 comments about Section 314 were received, and over
70% of those came from laypeople or unofficial organizations. But before
turning to the Section 314 rulemaking proceeding, consider the evidence from a
number of different rulemaking proceedings. Figure 1 reports the number of
comments received in six different rulemaking proceedings. Because the extent
of participation across issues can be so dramatically disparate, I use a
logarithmic scale to compare the total amount of participation. A two-fold
increase along the chart’s horizontal axis represents a ten-fold increase in the
number of comments. The first bar corresponds to the Section 314 rulemaking
described above.116 The next bar reports on participation in the various
regulations that the Federal Election Commission recently issued to implement
the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act, popularly known as the “McCainFeingold” law.117 The third bar reports on comments received by the September
11 Victim Compensation Fund at the Department of Justice in connection with
its rulemaking proceeding.118 The fourth bar indicates the number of comments
received by the Environmental Protection Agency in connection with the
116

See Appendix for a discussion of the source.
th
Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 2183, 105 Cong. (1998). The total
comments listed reflect all the comments received on regulations implementing the new
campaign finance reform law, including (1) 1116 comments on public financing of presidential
candidates and conventions, see 68 Fed. Reg. 47386; (2) 4 comments on consolidated reporting
requirements, see 68 Fed. Reg. 404; (3) 51 comments on coordinated and independent
expenditures, see 68 Fed. Reg. 421, (4) 13 comments on misuse of campaign funds and related
issues, see 67 Fed. Reg. 76962; (5) 25 comments on contribution limits, see 67 Fed. Reg. 69928;
(6) only 47 comments on regulations implementing the “electioneering communication”
provisions that appear to have important free speech implications, see 67 Fed. Reg. 65190; (7) 5
comments on the administrative reorganization of regulations on “contribution” and
“expenditure”, see http://www.fec.gov/register.htm; and (8) 2 comments on the extent of
administrative fines, see 68 Fed. Reg. 12572.
118
These include 806 comments received in response to the initial notice of inquiry, 2687
comments specifically on the interim final rule, and 628 comments on the regulation received
after the deadline. Jonathan D. Melber, An Act of Discretion: Rebutting Cantor Fitzgerald’s
Critique of the Victim Compensation Fund, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 749, 750-55 (2003).
117
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National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter and Ozone in
1997.119 The fifth bar indicates the number of comments recently received by the
Federal Communications Commission in the course of recent rulemaking
proceedings changing local media ownership restrictions.120 The final bar shows
the number of comments received on the Food and Drug Administration’s
regulations on cigarette sale and distribution to minors.121
What the figure shows is that at least some rulemaking proceedings seem
to attract mass participation. The specific rates of participation vary between
172 in the Section 314 rulemaking proceeding to approximately 700,000 for the
FDA regulations involving the sale of cigarettes to minors. Admittedly,
comment periods vary and many of these comments may reflect organized letterwriting efforts by interest groups. Nonetheless, the scale of participation in
some rulemaking proceedings belies simple explanations suggesting that only
parties with a narrow economic stake (or something like it) would participate.
Witness the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund. Though only a small
number of individuals would be eligible for benefits, the agency received 50
times as many comments as were received about Section 314 – a regulation
affecting, in principle, everyone in the country.122 The scale of participation on
the media control and cigarette sale regulations at least hints at the possibility
that larger chunks of the public might become quite interested in regulatory
policy. Even if many of these comments came from members of interest groups,
those groups must still find ways of motivating a mass membership to send in
comments.
This suggests that given the right alignment of political
circumstances, media attention, and institutional factors, hundreds of thousands
of citizens might take the time to express their views about regulatory policy.

119

See 62 Fed. Reg. 38652; 62 Fed. Reg. 38856, 38858.
See Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 2002 Biennial Regulatory
Review–Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted
Pursuant to Section 202 of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, FCC 03-127, 5 (2003), avail. at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-03-127A1.pdf.
121
See Rules and Regulations: Department of health and Human Services, Regulations
Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children
and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44396, 44417.
122
It would be hard to argue that the rates of participation somehow reflect the “importance” of
the regulation. Participation is probably driven by a host of factors, including media attention to
the regulatory issue involved, the issue’s inherent salience, and the organizational efforts of
interest groups. This foreshadows an important theme to which I return later: members of the
public may have one reaction if they consider an issue superficially and another if they reflect on
it. This is true not only in the decision to allocate scarce resources to participate in one
rulemaking (say, the Victim Compensation Fund regulation) as opposed to another (say, Section
314), but in what they think of on the merits. Just as it is important to understand how the
political context might affect individuals’ judgments on the merits (which I discuss below), we
must learn more about what drives citizens’ initial impressions of what issue is worth
commenting on in the first place. See Part III.b.
120
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Given the tiny number of comments received about Section 314
compared to, say, the number of comments on the FDA cigarette sale
regulations, one might imagine the commenters on Section 314 were probably
just organized interests with an economic agenda. Not so. In fact the experience
with Section 314 shows that laypeople participated in greater numbers than any
other kind of participants. This is striking in some ways. The vast majority of
commenters were not members of organized interest groups or businesses, but
ordinary laypeople or representatives of unofficial local associations such as the
self-styled “San Jacinto Constitutional Study Group.” Thus participation seems
skewed towards individuals. Yet while most of these individuals raise a
recurrent and clearly identifiable concern – privacy – they submit comments that
are tremendously unsophisticated.
A substantial majority of comments – over 70% -- came from individuals
with no stated organizational affiliation. None of these comments appeared to be
form letters. This is not what would be expected from much of the literature on
124
who is concerned about regulatory policy. Conversely FinCEN did not receive
a single comment from general membership not-for-profit organizations that
123

Several sources provided these figures. See notes 63-68, supra for the sources. Rates of
participation for the air quality, media control, and cigarette sale to minors regulations are
approximate figures reported in the Federal Register.
124
See generally David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran, Administrative Procedures, Information,
and Agency Discretion, 38 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 697 (1994).
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could have added a relevant perspective to the regulatory process here. Figure
1 shows the breakdown.
2. OVERALL BREAKDOWN OF COMMENTS BY CATEGORY

Bus in e s s
1 4 .0%

Or g rep . bu s in e ss
1 2 .8%

Unofficia l g r ou p
1 .2 %

In divid ua l
7 2 .1%

Different commenters showed radically different concerns about the
regulation.
As Figure 3 indicates below, individual commenters
disproportionately mentioned privacy concerns. Businesses and organizations
representing them tended to raise multiple concerns, but only rarely did they
address privacy.

3. COMPARISON OF ISSUES MENTIONED BY COMMENT TYPE
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While the majority of the comments came from individuals
– and the vast
majority of such comments focused on concerns
about privacy-- these
comments proved to be tremendously unsophisticated. The appendix discusses
how I evaluated the sophistication of the comments. Figure 3 shows a
comparison of the sophistication of the different commenter types. Few of them
recognized the distinction between the regulation and the statute, and only a
meager number offered anything remotely resembling a concrete proposal.
Instead, individual commenters came across as being angry and exasperated at
what they viewed as unjustifiednges
cha in government’s access to private
financial information. The following is a typical comment.
Privacy is a Constitutional right, why should we the people have any
more rights removed. This act means the terrorist [sic] win. You have
all the necess
ary instruments in place to follow the terrorist actions
now.125
125

Section 314 Comments,
supra note ___, comment # 45. The commenter continues:
This is still one nation under God. How about we
his,dohow
t about we repent and get
some super help from him. I guarantee you he knows exactly who’s guilty and whose
[sic] innocent and where they are.
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So while the individual comments raised concerns about privacy and
government accountability, there was no mention of providing sunsets for the
regulation, building in reporting mechanisms to oversee the law enforcement
agencies making the information requests, or providing remedies to people
whose records turned out to be improperly obtained or used.
4. COMPARING SOPHISTICATION, LENGTH, AND IMPACT BY COMMENT
TYPE
5

4

3

2
T ot al sophist ication
Lengt h of comment

1

( pages or f ract ions)
Comment impact
( changes adopt ed)

0
Individual
Unof f . org.

Business
Busines s group/ rep.

Comment er ident it y ( i.e., individual, group, and so on)

iv. What does an agencyo dwith the comments it receives?
I have argued that it is hard to dismiss the privacy concerns as being
irrelevant, either to the statutory scheme or in principle. The question then arises
whether the disproportionately unsophisticated comments made
aypeople
by l
concerned about privacy led to some kind of change in the regulation. They did
not. In fact, the changes made in the regulation appeared to respond exclusively
to comments that came in from the private sector.
On the one hand, since the bulkthe
of comments raised a concern about
privacy one might expect that this would affect the resulting regulations
– or at
least the agency’s response to the comments in the Federal Register. On the
other hand, as Figure 4 also shows, the disproportionate
centration
con
of
sophistication among the comments from businesses and organizations
representing them might suggest that these would be the comments that
influence the agency’s response. One might also think that financial institutions
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and the organizations representing them would have a disproportionate impact
because of their greater concentration of political power.126
The fact is there were no changes in the regulation to address the privacy
concerns brought up by the vast majority of commenters. The resulting
regulations do not include, for example, a sunset provision, nor do they create a
remedy for violations of the certification requirement, or any other mechanism to
address the privacy concerns raised by the vast majority of commenters.
Predictably enough, sophistication and status as a business or organization
representing business yield a strong prediction of whether the agency
implemented a requested change.127 The striking relationship is obvious in
Figure 5, which plots each comment’s adjusted sophistication (defined as the
product of the qualitative sophistication grade times the number of pages)
against the comment’s impact, as measured by the number of suggestions
actually adopted made in any given comment.128
The table that follows reports the results of an ordinary least squares
regression predicting a comment’s impact (measured by the number of issues
raised in the comment that the agency addressed in its revised regulation) from
its sophistication and whether or not the comment came from some private
sector entity.129 The first regression (reported in the left column) reports the
result of a regression including all the comments. The second regression
(reported in the right column) describes a regression on just the comments
coming from business or its representatives. Sophistication and commenter
status (as a business or its representative) both have coefficients with positive
130
The second regression shows that – even among the comments from
signs.

126

Cf. Olson, supra note ___, at ___. See also James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation in
THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 357 (J.Q. Wilson, ed. 1980)
127
There does not appear to be a significant multicollinearity problem. See D. Gujarati, Basic
Econometrics 319 (1995). In the multivariate OLS regressions reported in Table 5, the ratios of
the maximum and minimum eigenvalues are under 100. See id. at 338. Klein’s rule of thumb
2
suggests that multicollinearity may be a troublesome problem only if the R obtained from
2
auxiliary regressions of the independent variables in the equations are greater than the overall R .
See L.R. KLEIN, AN INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMETRICS 101(1962). That is not the case here (the
2
R for an auxiliary regression of adjusted sophistication and whether commenter is a business or
its representative is .46).
128
The Appendix describes the details of how I coded for length and qualitative sophistication. I
checked for robustness by examining the effect of qualitative sophistication by itself. The results
were not materially different.
129
OLS regression is appropriate here because the dependent variable is continuous (i.e., number
of issues raised in the comment that the agency actually addressed in its revised regulations). To
check for robustness I also used a logistic regression (logit) model, where the dependent variable
was whether the agency’s final regulations had addressed any issue that the comment raised. The
results were not materially different.
130
Although statistical significance is not directly relevant because the figures reflect the result of
a population, not a sample, regression function, the coefficients for the dependent variables
would have been statistically significant if the data reflected a sample.
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businesses and their representatives – sophistication still seems to affect the
extent to which the agency addresses concerns raised in the comments.
5. SOPHISTICATION
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6. PREDICTING “COMMENT IMPACT” BY COMMENT TYPE
AND SOPHISTICATION
For
Comments

All

Dependent
Variable:
Comment Impact

For
Comments
From Businesses or
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Dependent Variable:
Comment Impact
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Constant
Unstandardized
coefficient
(Standard error)

.0001

1.067

(.043)

Adjusted
Sophistication
Unstandardized
coefficient
Standardized
coefficient
(Standard error)

.0493

.0492

.472
(.005)

.584
(.01)

1.065

--

.481

--

(.113)

--

.763
.761
270.9

.341
.326
22.76

Commenter Type
(i.e., Commenter
is a Business or
Its
Representative)
Unstandardized
coefficient
Standardized
coefficient
(Standard error)
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
F Statistic for the
Regression

Table reports unstandardized OLS multiple regression coefficients, standardized
coefficients, and standard errors in parentheses.

It makes sense to expect that the commenters’ political and economic
power drives the agency’s differential response to the comments. There is a
substantial literature on this in political science,131 and there are certainly
substantial theory-related grounds to believe that agencies would be sensitive not
only to litigation risk but also to interest groups’ political responses to an
undesired regulation. Yet the data provide at least some reasons to believe that
agency responses here might be driven not only by differences in political power
but also by differences in sophistication. If one examines only the comments
from businesses and organizations representing them, there is still a strong
relationship between adjusted sophistication and agency responsiveness to the
comment.

131

See generally E.E. Schattschneider, The Scope and Bias of the Pressure System, in CLASSIC
READINGS IN AMERICAN POLITICS (Pietro S. Nivola & David H. Rosenbloom, eds. 1990).
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Admittedly, these data do not include controls for the potential political
or economic influence of businesses or organizations commenting.132 Neither
can we tell how much back-channel lobbying businesses or their representatives
conducted with the agency (though there are some legal limits on this).133 Yet
individuals and unofficial organizations tend to have far less political power than
businesses and organizations representing them, so the fact that a comment
comes from one of these entities can serve as a proxy for political power – and it
is not altogether obvious that, once we screen out individuals and unofficial
organizations, sophistication would correlate highly with political power.134
Some people might argue that the inclusion of default rules limiting the
scope of searches could be a partial reaction to concerns about privacy. Perhaps
– but even the agency did not characterize this change in those terms, focusing
instead on its administrative cost benefit to financial institutions.135 Moreover,
regardless of whether the default rules are a step in the right direction from the
privacy perspective, no other aspect of the regulation even remotely addresses
such concerns.
The certification requirement seems to follow in a
straightforward way from the language of the statute, not from some concern
about privacy (and in any case, there is basically no remedy for a violation of it).
And broadening the definition of financial institutions eligible for the safe harbor
seems to cut against privacy concerns.
Regarding the agency’s written response to the comments, what is still
more striking is that the agency did not even bother to discuss privacy concerns
(except perhaps in the most oblique way) in its Federal Register response
including the final regulation. Under existing law agencies get some leeway in
deciding how to group categories of comments for the purpose of responding to
their arguments;136 presumably what keeps them from using this flexibility to
ignore whole categories of comments is the threat of litigation. If the agency
largely ignored the mass of comments raising privacy concerns, the reason may
132

Nor does it necessarily make sense to use status as a single business versus status as an
organization as a proxy for political influence. For example, a single business commenting (such
as Wells Fargo Bank) might plausibly have more power than some organizations (such as the
National Association of Credit Unions). In any case, status as an organization representing
business is not statistically-significant in a regression predicting comment impact by adjusted
sophistication and status as an organization (for status as organization, t=-.938, and p=.353).
133
See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981)(although blanket limitations on
ex parte contacts only suitable for regulatory proceedings similar to adjudication or formal
rulemaking, agency must place in rulemaking record an adequate summary of all post-comment
conversations and meetings that were of “central relevance” to the rulemaking). Agencies also
promulgate regulations limiting the scope of their ex parte contacts. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 4.7
(FTC rules limiting ex parte contact in the course of informal rulemaking); 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.120113 (FCC rules).
134
Indeed, the opposite hypothesis is also plausible: if sophisticated persuasive appeals and
political influence are substitutes, then more power might make it less important to make a
complex, lawyerly appeal for a chance in the regulations.
135
See Section 314 Final Rule Statement, supra note ___, at 60583.
136
See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 409.
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be both the relative lack of sophistication in the comments as well as the dim
prospects that members of the San Jacinto Constitutional Study Group (or any
one of the other commenters, for that matter) would litigate if they were ignored.
The underlying statute may explicitly restrict the factors that an agency can
consider in making regulations.137 That’s not the case here. If anything, the
statute evinces some concern about privacy through its explicit concern with
restricting the scope of increased sharing of information to situations where there
is reasonable suspicion of money laundering or terrorism.138
Notice that none of my observations here disparage the hard work of the
regulatory staff in responding to comments and crafting the regulations. The
staff of a regulatory agency, like anyone else, responds to the available legal
tools and the incentives shaping their environment. Thus the agency tracked the
comments submitted on Section 314 and responded to those it considered
relevant and significant. It made changes in the regulation in response to some
comments. And yet in the end, a substantial majority of the comments went
largely excluded.
C.

Administrative Pluralism’s Empirical Presuppositions Are Questionable

In the end, the administrative pluralism model seems supported by
certain realities of the administrative state, but not by others. Notice and
comment rulemaking, subject to judicial review, probably serves as some sort of
constraint on agencies. FinCEN responded to many of the categories of
comments regarding Section 314, and so lived up to its responsibilities under
139
existing law. This is worth something. Moreover, legislative and presidential
control does matter. Studies using various kinds of methodologies clearly show

137

See American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 472.
The agency obviously has some discretion in making sense of these requirements, but that’s
not a convincing reason for it to ignore the privacy-related comments. Let me elaborate. Even if
the agency argued that Chevron deference entitled it to interpret the statute so that privacy
concerns were excluded, such a move does not extinguish its responsibility to consider
significant arguments about the regulation. Otherwise it would hardly make sense for the court
to have decided in Mead that the agency could not automatically Chevron deference, and that the
opportunity for public comment available through notice-and-comment rulemaking was a factor
militating in favor of deference. See Mead, _____The agency’s choice of interpretation is, after
all, an important decision – particularly if its implication is to exclude the importance of concerns
raised by the bulk of commenters on the statute. To dismiss the significance of the privacyrelated public comments on statutory grounds implies that unless the statute specifically
commands the agency to consider privacy, the agency can choose not to do so. That does not
follow from American Trucking, nor does it follow from the rest of the legal structure of
administrative law. Sometimes the statute does not explicitly list the factors the agency should
consider in issuing regulations, even if it does provide a bound on the scope of agency discretion
that is sufficient to survive whatever remains of the nondelegation doctrine.
139
See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at ___.
138
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that the political context matters.140 The president’s appointees shape the
agency’s work,141 and even after that the executive retains a measure of residual
142
decisionmaking authority to influence the legislative process. One should be
wary of idealizing representative politics. It is heavily influenced by organized
interest group activity.143 Still, voters can use heuristics to make decisions about
candidates and parties that have at least an indirect impact on politicians, who in
144
turn can affect regulation.
In short, the experience with Section 314 and other regulations shows
how the reality of the existing approach to public engagement is consistent with
much of the positive theory behind administrative pluralism. That same
experience raises questions, though, about its prescriptive ideas. (1) On
expertise, the administrative pluralism model confounds two ideas: one is the
importance of expert judgment for some (perhaps even many) regulatory issues,
and the other is the claim that expert judgment is the core activity of all
regulatory policymaking. (2) Even leaving aside the problem that interest group
strength is lopsided for a lot of issues, the experience with Section 314 makes it
hard to believe the milder conjecture that, at least, different sorts of interest
groups will participate in rulemaking proceedings, covering all the normatively
145
important issues with sophisticated arguments for the agency to consider. (3)
The administrative pluralism model does not expect members of the public to
participate, yet many did so here. It is true that they seemed disproportionately
unsophisticated and concerned about a single issue – but this may be a reason to
140

See generally Matthew McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 164 (1984); Barry R.
Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory
Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765 (1983); Barry R.
Weingast, The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal-Agent Perspective (With
Applications to the SEC), 44 PUB. CHOICE 147 (1984).
141
th
See, e.g., Am. Iron and Steel Inst. V. OSHA, 182 F.3d 1261, 1268 (11 Cir. 1999)(“Logic
dictates that an agency must have some discretion in setting an agenda for rulemaking and
excluding some matters categorically.”). See also Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration 114
HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2343 (2001).
142
See Terry M. Moe, Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration, 26 AM. J. POLI.
SCI. 197, 220-22 (1982).
143
See Schattschneider, supra note 131, at ____.
144
See, e.g., ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN
CITIZENS LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? (1998) (emphasizing the role of candidate
reputation in voters’ reasoned decisions about representative politics); SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE
REASONING VOTER: COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS (1991)
(emphasizing the role of retrospective evaluations and candidate evaluations to argue that voters’
choices in presidential elections are “rational”).
145
To believe this, one would have to believe that the concerns raised by the sophisticated
commentators were the only important ones. That’s hard to accept. It may be this problem only
arises in times of crisis – and perhaps then only for regulations involving national security and
law enforcement. If so, it’s still a serious problem. But it’s not certain that for other regulatory
matters, there will be sufficiently diverse interest group participation to make sure that various
important aspects of an issue are discussed with sophistication.
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ask whether disparities in sophistication can be remedied. Others among the
public may be both more sophisticated (at least when initially asked), and more
willing to balance competing concerns – but they did not participate. This is
hardly surprising, given the relatively low likely returns of taking the time to
write a comment as an individual. (4) While the administrative pluralism model
does not depend on or expect laypeople to participate, it does imply that the
government should not ignore laypeople who do take the time to participate.
The very fact of that participation is an indication of intensity of preference. Yet
the comments of laypeople who participated were effectively ignored here. In
contrast, the comments from private sector interests and their representatives
were discussed in detail by the agency, and many were able to directly influence
the resulting regulation. The more sophisticated commenters among businesses
or their representatives tended to have even more of an impact.
There are those who will still cling onto administrative pluralism despite
the lack of support for some of its empirical presuppositions. The less one
believes the empirical presuppositions I have critiqued, however, the more one
has to rely exclusively on representative politics to legitimate what happens in
the administrative state. There’s obviously something to this: representative
politicians have a lot of control over the administrative state. As with any kind
of theory of democracy, one might believe that our particular version of
representative democracy leads to good (enough) decisions, or that it is fair
enough to serve as a fount of procedural legitimacy. If one believes that strongly
in representative democracy, then decisions that emanate from representative
politicians will be imbued with sufficient legitimacy. The existing architecture
for public engagement would then be rendered acceptable because it was built by
representative politicians, and so too would it be just fine for legislators to
simply decide not to interfere with the Section 314 regulations as they ended up.
This not an incoherent position, but it is not appealing. There is no
denying that the current structure of the administrative state is politically
efficient, but it is a different thing altogether to say this makes it legitimate. To
equate the two is to buy into a pretty circular theory of legitimacy, unless one
has a separate theory of how the interests of representative politicians are aligned
with those of their constituents. The electoral mechanism plays a major role, but
one might question whether it consistently succeeds in aligning the relevant
interests. One can question this because of potential agency problems, and also
because of limitations in how voters make decisions. Voters may be able to use
simple mental short-cuts to make broad, reasonable overall judgments about
candidates and parties146 – but they can plainly make mistakes (when compared
to what they would find important if they had more information and time to
think about it) in deciding what are the most important issues on which they
want to base their decisions. Paternalism may not be the answer to these
shortcomings of voters in the arena of representative politics. Elected,
146

See ARTHUR LUPIA AND MATHEW MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA (1998).
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representative politicians designed the legal procedures of the administrative
state and have the power to undo regulatory decisions at any point. But the
potential shortcomings of representative democracy should make one skeptical
about the claim that public participation in regulatory decisions is irrelevant
simply because of the power that politicians retain.
None of this would surprise advocates of participatory democracy, who
have always been uneasy with the pluralist equation between descriptive theories
of interest group control and normative ideas about what makes for good
regulation. Regardless of whether they questioned administrative pluralism’s
empirical assumptions, people with an interest in participatory democracy seem
to believe that pluralism takes an unnecessarily narrow approach to democracy –
one that relies too heavily on interest-group and representative politician elites,
and that misses the larger value of involving the public in decisions shaping its
life. For believers in participatory democracy, there is something to be said for
for the view that people should have an effect on the regulatory process even if
they do not mobilize to comment – particularly when the regulations (as with
Section 314) involve complex trade-offs and no obvious competition between
organized, opposing interest groups. Indeed, unless one has a theory of
democracy where the failure to raise one’s voice automatically means one’s
participation is unimportant, then one should be concerned about the interests of
people who are affected in principle but do not participate in practice – either
because they did not comment at all, or because they commented but their
147
participation is not sophisticated enough for the agency to assimilate. In the
Parts that follow, I develop this perspective further and discuss the feasibility of
legal mechanisms to carry it out.
III.
ADMINISTRATIVE PLURALISM TAKES A NARROW APPROACH TO PUBLIC
ENGAGEMENT IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Any convincing evaluation of public engagement in the administrative
state must recognize an observation amply developed in the context of voting
rights scholarship and positive political theory: the “public will” does not exist in
some pure, unadulterated form. People’s views must be aggregated somehow,
and it is the scheme chosen – whether some kind of direct democracy, voting in
geographic districts, or the notice-and-comment process – that determines the
147

The data on participation in the Section 314 proceedings suggests that sophistication might
have an effect on the agency’s acceptance of commenter recommendations even if one is
considering only comments from businesses and organizations representing them. Thus, even if
one reason for the agency’s skewed response is the disproportionate political power of private
sector participants, there is room to be concerned about whether commenters possess adequate
sophistication.
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content of the public’s will.148 This underscores the need to look beyond legal
formalisms (i.e., whether there is a right to vote or a chance to comment on a
rule) to understand the impact of a preference aggregation mechanism.149 At its
148

The preference-aggregation mechanism (or “institutions”) can impact the derivation of the
public’s “will” in at least two different ways: most directly (and obviously), institutions
determine how preferences are counted up. See, e.g., Sam Issacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz,
Governing Through Intermediaries, 85 VA. L. REV. 1627 (1999); Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry
R. Weingast, Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice, 37 PUB. CHOICE 503
(1981). See generally SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN, AND RICHARD H. PILDES,
THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY (2d ed. 2001). But institutions can also shape how people develop
preferences over time. See, e.g. Cass R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 17
(1997). Sunstein aptly describes why taking preferences “as a given” seems to ignore the fact
that preferences are always constructed according to the context:
[T]he initial allocation creates the basic ‘reference state’ from which values and
judgments of fairness are subsequently made, and those judgments affect preferences
and private willingness to pay. Of course, a decision to make an entitlement alienable
or inalienable (consider the right to vote or reproductive capacities) can have
preference-shaping effects. Because of the preference-shaping effects of the rules of
allocation, it is difficult to see how a government might even attempt to take preferences
‘as given’ or as the basis for decisions in any global sense.
149

If there were simply an unadulterated “public will” existing in the abstract, it would be easy to
evaluate a preference aggregation scheme by comparing the result of the scheme to the
preexisting public will. But that is not possible. Moreover, to the extent that some mechanism
appears to get closer to this ideal through direct democracy, this does not necessarily make the
resulting system “better.” A recent case highlights some of the possible drawbacks of simply
incorporating a referendum into the administrative process. In 1995, the Buckeye Community
Hope Foundation purchased land zoned for apartments in the City of Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio and
set out to build Pleasant Meadows, an affordable housing complex. See City of Cuhayoga Falls
v. Buckeye Community Hope Foundation, avail. at 2003 WL 1477301 (2003). Using low-income
tax credits, the Buckeye Community Hope Foundation (Buckeye) obtained financing, bought
some land zoned for apartments – and then ran into a problem. As the plan wound its way
through the small city’s Planning Commission and City Council, a vocal group of city residents
coalesced to oppose Pleasant Meadows. They complained to the Planning Commission, which
imposed various conditions on the project, including that Buckeye build an earthen wall around
the whole project. Buckeye agreed, and the Planning Commission unanimously approved the
project, recommending it to the City Council.
The opponents of Pleasant Meadows were undaunted. The City Council meetings
scheduled to discuss Pleasant Meadows were anything but pleasant. Cuyahoga Falls’ Mayor
came to express his personal opposition to Pleasant Meadows. So did angry residents, who
voiced a number of concerns about the low-cost apartments: that the development would bring an
influx of families with children, that the families who lived there would cause crime and drug
activity to escalate, and (indeed) that it would attract a population similar to the one on Prange
Drive, which happened to be Cuyahoga Falls’ only predominantly African American
neighborhood. None of this swayed the City Council, which approved the project in April 1996
over the objections of the Mayor and a growing group of angry residents. Twenty eight days
after the Council approved Pleasant Meadows, its opponents filed a petition pursuant to local law
requesting that the ordinance approving Pleasant Meadows be submitted to a popular vote, which
the City allowed voters the “power to approve or reject at the polls any ordinance or resolution
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core, the administrative pluralism approach to public engagement is a
complicated mechanism for aggregating preferences. The most important
question about it is therefore not whether it provides a formal mechanism for
people’s interests to be considered, but instead what particular vision of
democracy is implicit in the administrative pluralism model when it comes time
to decide what to do with those interests.
In this Part, I trace the argument that administrative pluralism’s
underlying vision of democracy is unnecessarily constricted. The narrowness
comes from the fact that administrative pluralism – and the existing approach to
public engagement that it bolsters -- takes both the public’s interest in regulatory
policy and its sophistication as fixed variables that cannot be changed. This in
turn creates a sort of self-fulfilling prophesy: direct democracy seems like an
implausible and problematic alternative for shaping regulatory mandates based
on statutes like Section 314, and yet the existing legal framework does nothing
to convey the impression to members of the mass public (either individuals or in
the aggregate) that their cognitive or emotional investments in getting to know
the issues will have a payoff. Which suggests that an intellectually honest
version of administrative pluralism strand must now contend with the question
that the participatory democracy strand has always faced: how much
participation is enough, and what specific institutional mechanisms might
accomplish this?
A. Collective Decisionmaking Constantly Poses the Question of Sufficiency of
Participation

Unless we make unrealistic assumptions, any collective decisionmaking
process will give some people more power than others.150 Thus, depending on
passed by the Council” within 30 days of the ordinance’s passage). Cuyahoga Falls City Charger,
Art. 9, § 2, App. 14. The petition led to a referendum, in which voters decisively rejected the
prospect of Pleasant Meadows.
The use of the referendum here raises some potential problems. A mass election did not
appear to be the setting for participants to consider the long-term costs and benefits of building
Pleasant Meadows. If anything, the opposite happened: the facts suggest that the referendum
drive was fueled in part by racial animus against the black voters who would be the likely
beneficiaries of Pleasant Meadows. Yet the nature of equal protection doctrine virtually
eliminated Buckeye’s ability to challenge the referendum as a means of race discrimination
because of the difficulty of proving intent from the voters participating. The Ohio Supreme Court
eventually found the referendum invalid on the ground that the Ohio State Constitution
authorizes referendums only in relation to legislative acts, not administrative acts, such as the
site-plan ordinance. As this article demonstrates, the rationale for such a distinction is not as
strong as it seems. Nonetheless, the problems with referenda remain.
150
The literature on this topic is vast. At its center is Arrow’s famous impossibility theorem, and
the substantial literature critiquing it. For an insightful introduction to the debates surrounding
this result, see Richard H. Pildes and Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy;
Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121
(1990).
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the institutional details, collective decisions that supposedly depend on
democratic procedures can still empower an oligarchy. Procedures that are
supposed to be explicitly democratic – such as local elections, legislative voting,
or presidential contests – reflect dramatic differences in participation. Not
everyone legally entitled to be heard participates equally, and intensity of
participation rarely matches the precise extent of the interests at stake. Members
of an organization do not always have enough time to get to know the slates for
boards of directors. Constituents of a local school district may not all vote in the
local election. The electorate for presidential elections may not take the time to
discern the differences in positions between two candidates or make the effort to
vote in the primary. People face collective action problems. Even where
laypeople with a certain interest are represented by organized groups, these
groups form intermittently, and solve collective action problems only
imperfectly. In short, differential rates of participation affect virtually all
democratic decisionmaking procedures.
What is more, such a skew in participation need not be a disaster. We
might still value collective decisionmaking procedures that make participation
easier for some people than for others. If people participate at different rates and
with different intensity, perhaps this shows differences in the intensity of their
underlying preference – which is certainly valuable information under certain
conditions.
It would be costly, possibly unconstitutional, and perhaps
unworkable to ensure that everyone participated to the same degree in a given
collective decision. And despite such limits, differences in a speaker’s
articulateness or an audience’s receptivity would skew the impact of
participation in any case.
Not only might we still value collective
decisionmaking procedures that reflect or depend on differential rates of
participation, but changing such differences in participation might entail various
kinds of costs – ranging from administrative complexity to free speech
restrictions.
Yet the distortions themselves are also costs, which emerge when we
consider the most often-cited rationales for some kind of democratic
decisionmaking. For some observers, democratic collective decisions are
valuable because they allow people who will be impacted by the decision to
participate in making it.151 For others, democracy is valuable because it allows a
majority of the relevant community to choose the best course of action in a
public-spirited way after some kind of deliberation.152 For still others, the
potential chaos and unpredictability of democracy is valuable because at least it
151

See, e.g., Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 312, 321
(1997)(describing “procedural” theories of democracy that highlight the “inherent fairness or
justice of its system of substantial and equal participation in legislation by the governed.”).
152
See, e.g., Bohman, supra note___, at ___ (discussing the inherent value of incorporating
people who will be affected by a decision into the process of decisionmaking). See also JÜRGEN
HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW
AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1995).
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provides information useful in policymaking that would not otherwise be
available to government.153 All of these rationales are reminiscent of the
participatory democracy strand of thought regarding public engagement in the
administrative state. They are undercut to some extent by distortions in
participation. The distortions introduce the possibility that people with a stake in
the collective decision will simply not participate. The distortions also make it
harder to achieve any sort of majoritarian deliberation in the decision. For
example, suppose that voting in the election for Insurance Commissioner costs
the average citizen goes from about $5 to about $7 in time and effort (perhaps
because polling places are closed). Suppose further that as a result of this
change, 10% fewer citizens decide that it is worth their effort to take part in the
election. Even if the loss of that 10% of voters does not render the election
illegitimate, the loss weakens the claim that the democratic, collective decision is
legitimate because people affected participated. The loss of voters also weakens
the claim that the election reflects the result of some kind of desirable
majoritarian deliberation. Finally, the loss of the 10% of voters deprives the new
insurance commissioner of information about (and much of the incentive to care)
how some chunk of the electorate reacted to her candidacy.
The formalistic answer to this quandary is to say something like this:
“Look, whatever the electoral institutions require as a minimum rate of
participation is enough! Not everyone wants to participate in making decisions
about Section 314 or the rules for elections or whatever, and not everyone should
154
be made to do so.” This answer of course begs part of the question because the
minimum degree of participation is determined by law, and the law itself is the
product of the democratic process. Nonetheless, whatever one thinks of the
formalistic answer in the legislative context, it seems like that answer is even
less satisfactory for the rest of the administrative state. Consider some of the
problems with delegation. The work of agencies is one step removed from the
155
work of legislators. Of course, legislators can also be swayed more directly by
voters when the issue catches popular attention – but this again presupposes that
there is some concordance between the issues that catch popular attention and
those that are normatively important. One might plausibly conclude that
153

See, e.g., Amartya Sen, The Economics of Life and Death, SCI. AM. 40 (May 1993)(describing
democracies’ ability to avoid famines). See also Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, supra note___,
at 163 n.1 (“[W]e consider the representativeness of the participatory input from the perspective
of a concern with its impact on the communication of citizens’ needs and preferences to political
elites and thus a concern with equal protection of interests”).
154
Cf. Rubin, supra note___, at ___ (suggesting that the existing arrangements for participation
and decisionmaking in the administrative state are legitimate, and that excessive idealized
thinking about democracy is confusing in this arena).
155
See, e.g., Theodore Lowi, Two Roads to Serfdom: Liberalism, Conservatism, and
Administrative Power, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 295, 296-312, 314-18, 321-22 (1987).Theodore Lowi,
The End of Liberalism, in FOUNDATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 166, 169 (PETER H. SCHUCK
ED., 1994)(“modern law has become a series of instructions to administrators rather than a series
of commands to citizens”).
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delegations, on the margin, make it no easier and perhaps harder for the
members of the public to understand and monitor the law’s development -particularly for those chunks of the public who have not yet decided if they
care.156
Notice also that the legal machinery of the administrative state opens up
some possibilities for galvanizing participation that would be harder to achieve
in a garden-variety collective decisionmaking process like a town meeting or a
school board election. In contrast to other collective decisionmaking procedures,
the administrative state does its regulatory work through institutions that are
explicitly designed to integrate technical and legal decisionmaking with some
kind of public input. This makes it a little easier to solve the administrability
problems that might arise with alternative approaches to public engagement. All
of this should make one question whether the administrative pluralism model
takes too narrow a view of public participation in the administrative state.
For some observers, the meager participation in shaping regulatory
policy would be less problematic if citizens lacked the cognitive ability or
personal interest to understand regulatory policy. That would make it futile to
involve the public. On the surface, it certainly seems as though such deficiencies
in the public’s interest and sophistication exist. Lay people rarely say that they
care about specific regulatory policies, even if they more frequently note their
concern over substantive matters affected by regulatory policy such as privacy or
environmental protection. This generalized concern hardly seems like an
appropriate basis to justify more public involvement in regulatory policy, since
the lay public makes mistakes in understanding risk and glosses over important
details of a regulatory issue. Nonetheless, not every member of the public is
equally unsophisticated: some people have perfectly relevant expertise but do not
comment. More provocatively, what if citizens’ interest and sophistication when
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The argument is not that delegations are either undesirable or unconstitutional. On the legal
question, Posner and Vermeule, supra note ___, advance persuasive arguments against judicial
invalidations of legislative action on nondelegation grounds. Earlier, Mashaw argued in a similar
vein in favor of delegating powers to the executive branch. See Jerry Mashaw, Prodelegation:
Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON & ORG. 81 (1985). My point
here is that delegations might make participation particularly important because they make
elections less of an effective proxy for what voters think about regulatory issues. There are, of
course, exceptions that I have described earlier, where substantial chunks of the public acquire an
intense interest in a regulatory decision. See supra note__ (discussing the extent of interest in the
tobacco and telecommunications media ownership regulations). But leaving aside these
exceptions, my conjecture is that high-profile legislative votes receive more attention than
regulatory proceedings that become routine because they have been delegated. Some members
of the public take cues from interest groups with which they identify in trying to make sense of
legal developments, and those groups might often keep track of regulatory policy. But the
literature on leadership dynamics within interest groups and the experience with Section 314
highlight limits in the role interest groups can be expected to play in informing the public about
policy developments.
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thinking about matters like the Section 314 regulations or local media
ownership were fluid?
B. Citizens’ Interest and Sophistication for Understanding Regulatory
Policy Are Not Fixed
It turns out that neither interest nor sophistication is fixed. Both are a
product of how the law structures the opportunity for people to participate in
regulatory policymaking.157 Just as juries change their perceptions during the
course of a trial, so to can laypeople or even experts come to view issues
differently after an opportunity to reflect. This makes it strange to dismiss
questions about the extent of participation in regulatory by insisting that citizens
lack cognitive sophistication and interest. Such an argument begs the question
of whether the existing distribution of sophistication of interest is the “right”
one, or whether the goal should be to engage the public by increasing their
sophistication and interest in some way.
i. Sophistication is not fixed
What sort of ability does a member of the public have to deal with
Section 314 and the issues it raises? An individual’s sophistication might be
understood to mean her capacity to make insightful and coherent political
decisions. In this context, “insightful” means that the decisions or observations
that the layperson makes are not otherwise available in the regulatory
rulemaking activities of the administrative state (i.e., through representative
158
politicians, experts, or public opinion polls). Coherence, meanwhile, refers to
the idea that a participant’s views are not completely contradictory or incapable
of assimilating relevant information to the decision.159 One might think that
laypeople’s very experiences as laypeople might give them insight into how to
value the harm done if government inappropriately discloses financial
information. On the other hand, voters’ apparently limited insight on other
matters, and their apparent dearth of coherence might raise questions about how
much a non-expert could really contribute to regulatory policy.160
157

See Luskin et al., supra note ___ (discussing deliberative polls to set utility prices in Texas);
see also Robert C. Luskin, James S. Fishkin, & Roger Jowell, Considered Opinions: Deliberative
Polling in Britain, 32 BRITISH J. POLI. SCI. 455 (2002) (noting that the opinion changes among
participants in a “deliberative poll” in Britain on issues involving criminal justice do not seem to
be driven by social-demographic factors such as income or education, but by a combination of
factors including information gains).
158
The “insightful” idea therefore overlaps a bit with the idea that there is distortion in the
regulatory process that needs to be remedied.
159
Cf. Luskin, Fishkin, & Jowell, supra note ___, at 485 (“…it was those who wound up knowing
most, and presumably had learned most, who changed most.”).
160
See, e.g., Patricia A. Hurley & Kim Q. Hill, The prospects for Issue-Voting in Contemporary
Congressional Elections: An Assessment of Citizen Awareness and Representation, 8 AM. POL.
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In fact the conventional wisdom is that most members of the public lack
both the insight and coherence to play a useful role in informing regulatory
policy.161 Laypeople tend to experience the world by using heuristics that
simplify the complexity of their environment.162 Some of the problems people
have in understanding risk are predictable, and so they can probably be corrected
to some extent: in short, the mental short-cuts are not unchangeable.163 Their use
164
depends to some extent on the environment. If people experience a change of
setting or motivation, they can change the mental short-cuts they use to make
sense of a problem.165
People can probably display some additional
sophistication and less reflexive reliance on a mental short-cuts if they think
their opinion matters and they have access to more information.166 In contrast,
public opinion polls only provide a momentary snapshot of what people think;
providing people with information, and allowing them to think about it or
167
deliberate, can result in something more meaningful.
What all this implies is that individuals’ sophistication could be catalyzed
enough to understand complicated regulations. This observation is consistent
with the preceding discussion of democratic accountability in the administrative
Q. 425 (1980). For a useful survey of some of the empirical studies raising questions about
voters’ insight and coherence, see Donald R. Kinder & David O. Sears, Public Opinion and
Political Action, in 2 Handbook of Social Psychology 659 (Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson
eds., 3d ed. 1985).
161
See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE (1993). See also Jim Rossi,
Participation Run Amok:
The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative Agency
Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173 (1997).
162
See generally LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 144, at ____. See also Sniderman, supra note
2.
163
See, e.g., PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 190 (2000). Slovic reviews experimental
evidence on perceptions of risk and concludes that “an accident that takes many lives may
produce relatively little social disturbance… if it occurs as part of a familiar and well-understood
system (e.g., a train wreck). However, a small accident in an unfamiliar system…, such as a
nuclear reactor or a recombinant DNA laboratory, may have immense social consequences if it is
perceived as a harbinger of further and possibly catastrophic mishaps.”).
164
See, e.g., James P. Morris et al., Activation of Political Attitudes: A Psychophysiological
Examination of the Hot Cognition Hypothesis, 24 POL. PSYCH. 727 (2003)(affectively charged
political stimulus can affect evaluations of information).
165
See Sunstein, Risk and Reason, supra note ___, at 265 (describing how risk communication
studies successfully informed the redesign of EPA information).
166
See supra note ___, at ___ (discussing research showing how changes in the setting can
provoke people to use more sophisticated cognition to understand a complex problem).
167
An entire research program in political science at one point seemed to indicate that public’s
views were suffused with attitudes that had little if any coherence. See See Helmut Norpoth &
Milton Lodge, The Difference Between Attitudes and Nonattitudes in the Mass Public: Just
Measurement? 29 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 291 (1985) (noting that instability in responses to political
attitude surveys is partly explained by “nonattitudes,” where respondents provide an opinion
indicating that they have a particular attitude about an issue when they may not).. See also
Luskin, supra note ___, at ____. This research program, coupled with the inconsistencies and
shortcomings in responses revealed by regular public opinion polls, makes some people question
whether the public can ever make a useful direct contribution to choices in policymaking.
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pluralism model of public engagement. Even the seemingly ridiculous
comments about Section 314 cannot be dismissed completely, because a
different process might evoke more sophisticated responses from the
commenters. This might be achieved for two different reasons: (1) a different
process (i.e., explicitly putting risk profiles “on screen”) could inform the
participants in some regulatory proceeding about what is at stake, and correct
some of the limitations of the mental short-cuts they might be using; (2)
signaling to someone that their opinion matters might give them incentives to
become informed and analyze information on their own. The question then
becomes whether members of the lay public would have an interest in doing any
of this.
ii. Interest is not fixed
Does the public care about Section 314, or does the relative lack of
attention it has received amount to some kind of normatively attractive
equilibrium? Like sophistication, an individual’s perception of her interest in a
particular issue is not static. The motivation to understand an issue – like the
motivation to get involved in political activity – can respond to changes in a
person’s environment. If forming an opinion on an issue seems costly and
people believe there is little reason to do so, it is no mystery that people might
not invest in being informed. Thus, a person planning to buy a car may not
recognize that her vehicle’s purchase price might be driven in part by the safety
record of the plant where the cars are manufactured, because lower safety might
raise the wage that a company needs to offer workers, and (assuming
competition does not constrain the manufacturer) the extra labor costs might be
passed on to the consumer. The preceding discussion sheds some light on how
individuals’ sophistication react to the environment, which can help break the
cycle where limited information contributes to lack of interest. Regardless of
168
whether the interest perceived is entirely self-regarding or not, people who
169
overcome their lack of time or attention and participate are likely to be those
who see specific value in such activity. There is no good reason to think that
perception of value will be fixed rather than dynamic.
A contrary view would suggest that interests are more rigid, and in
particular, that they are driven largely by financial and economic factors. This
view would emphasize the idea that when people have financial stakes in the
outcome of a regulation (as do the banks in the case of Section 314), they will
168

See Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, supra note___, at 529 (“In discussing the reasons they
became active, participants make clear… that they think of themselves as acting for the common
good.”).
169
See id., at 129 (surveying the public to assess the determinants of political activity, and finding
those not active gave the following among the major reasons for not getting involved: lack of
time, 39%; prioritizing family over the welfare of the polity, 34%; irrelevance of politics to
“important things in… life,” 20%).
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exhibit an interest in the outcome. Yet the reality is that people make decision
on the basis of more than just their own material interests. They also care about
how other people in the polity are doing.170 And when they are concerned about
their own situation, the concerns are not only about financial or economic
status.171 This helps explain why dozens of individuals wrote to comment on the
Section 314 regulations. Nonetheless, interest in politics is rarely enough to
make someone participate in political activity – time, money, and skills have
also have a large effect.172
Now consider Section 314 in light of the preceding insights about the
possibility of changing people’s perceptions of their interests. The law’s effect
is quite broad. It can allow the financial transaction information of anyone in the
country to be obtained by government agents as long as they fill out a
certification. It effectively creates a substantial limitation on the Right to
Financial Privacy Act, and also lets financial institutions share information about
anyone, with few limits. Not all of this is apparent to the disaggregated mass of
individuals who are going to be affected by this, not even those whose activities
or positions might make them more liable to be affected by the new authority. It
would seem wrong to ascribe the apparent lack of interest among more people to
a deliberate conclusion that Section 314 did not matter all that much. Instead, it
is entirely possible that they care but don’t think they will make a difference
(i.e., the unsophisticated commenters on Section 314 did not make a difference,
after all). But information and a belief in one’s efficacy can change individuals’
sophistication and interest.
C. Public Engagement Is Not Anathema to Rigorous Risk Analysis
A lot of regulatory policy depends on rigorous risk analysis, where
someone competent considers the extent to which a regulation might achieve a
particular benefit given a certain cost. Yet laypeople have in understanding
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See.e.g, Donald Kinder & D. Roderick Kiewit, Sociotropic Politics, 11 BRITISH J. POLI. SCI.
129 (1981) (political attitudes not driven by views of personal material gain but by, among other
things, conceptions of what would advance overall economic well-being). Any framework that
views political activity in terms of rational, goal-seeking behavior must still accept that it’s not
just narrow material interest that makes people do things.
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See generally Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and
“Empirical” Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199 (1988).
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See, e.g., Henry E. Brady, Sidney Verba, & Kay Lehman Schlozman, Beyond SES: A
Resource Model of Political Participation, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 271, 285 (1995) (developing
and finding empirical support in cross-sectional studies of survey research for a model of
political participation where interest in politics is not enough to explain political participation,
and instead “[t]he resources of time, money, and skills are also powerful predictors of political
participation in America”).
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information about probabilities.
Some commentators have argued for
insulating administrative agencies from political and public interference on this
basis.173
Nonetheless, the fact that people use mental short-cuts does not
necessarily imply that different approaches to public engagement are
incompatible with reasoned decision-making about risk. Sometimes heuristics
174
may represent a reasonable way for people to economize on decision costs. Of
course, heuristics sometimes lead people astray. For example, people often have
trouble evaluating risk175 – and much of regulatory policy involves heavy doses
of risk analysis. But this observation merits a few answers. First, people do not
always ignore probability information.176 Second, regulation is not entirely
about risk. Section 314, for example, also required the agency to make decisions
about the extent of financial institutions’ administrative costs, and degree of
financial privacy protections that should exist given the absence of a
177
constitutional right to such privacy. Third, experts also have some problems
dealing with risk.178 This means that disparaging heuristics does not necessarily
imply that experts should replace laypeople. It is no surprise that experts are
often better at understanding risk and other complex concepts that affect
regulation, but that understanding is itself not impervious to the impact of
cognitive short-cuts. Fourth, people’s failure to consider probabilities in a
173

See Sunstein, Risk & Reason, supra note 3, at ___; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT
STATE 139 (2002)(defending default rules giving agencies wide latitude to conduct-cost benefit
analysis even when the legislature has not explicitly allowed it, in order to “increase the
rationality and sense of regulatory policy”).
174
See, e.g., LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 144, at ____ (discussing how retrospective
evaluations on key issues and other heuristics can help voters discipline policians); Sniderman,
supra note 2, at ____.
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Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982)
at 3.
176
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 67-68 (2002). Sunstein
writes:
By drawing attention to probability neglect, I do not mean to suggest that most people,
most of the time, are indifferent to large variations in the probability that a risk will
come to fruition. Large variations can, and often do, make a difference – but when
emotions are engaged, the difference is far less than the standard theory predicts. Nor
do I suggest that probability neglect is impervious to circumstances. If the costs of
neglecting probability are placed “on screen,” then people will be more likely to attend
to the question of probability.
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Moreover, there is a distinction between risk – involving situations where probabilities can be
assigned – and uncertainty – where probabilities are not known. SEE JON ELSTER, EXPLAINING
TECHNICAL CHANGE 185-207 (1983). While subjective probability estimates from experts are
probably a great place to start in thinking about uncertainty, it may not be the only ingredient one
would want to consider. Cf. McGarity, supra note___, at ___.
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See, e.g., SCOTT SAGAN, THE LIMITS OF SAFETY 250-55 (1993).
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normatively defensible way can often be affected by the choice situation –
which is just another application of the larger principle that sophistication is
partly endogenous to the choice setting.179 Fifth, some alternative approaches to
public engagement could involve experts or other stakeholders who might be as
sophisticated as the decisionmakers within the agency. Finally, there is at least
an open question whether some of the public’s likely distortions in considering
risk (i.e., the dread of dying one way versus another way) should affect the
assessment of certain risks.180
In some ways it seems the ambition of the administrative state has always
been to provide a legal mechanism for harmonizing expert judgment and public
input. That’s what many of the system’s advocates and proponents say.181 The
upshot is that alternative mechanisms for public engagement need not give the
public a monopoly on the content of a regulatory rule, any more than the existing
system – so strongly identified with the administrative pluralism strand of
thinking – gives commenters total control over the resulting rule. The challenge
is to strike a balance. One goal is to entice the administrative process to take
public input seriously. The other is to preserve the agency’s flexibility to act in
accordance with executive branch policy prescriptions and the views of technical
experts. Which means one can imagine alternative methods of public input
coexisting with technocratic schemes to inform regulatory policy, such as cost182
benefit analysis.
Of course, there would be no point in striking a balance if one clung to a
version of public engagement that was, by definition, satisfied with extent of
interest-group activity that the status quo accommodates.183 This is not the only
way to see things. One might believe instead in some version of “democracy”
where the public makes informed and sophisticated contributions to the
rulemaking process, where laypeople’s interest and sophistication are not taken
as a given but rather as qualities that can be catalyzed, and where the agency is
forced to take those insights seriously whether they come from bankers or
bakers. This view can be criticized or rejected in favor of the simpler one
179

See, e.g., HOWARD MARGOLIS, DEALING WITH RISK 91-92 (1996).
Put differently, it may be very difficult in principle (and not just because of heuristics people
use) to separate the evaluation of dreaded risks from the act of calculating its risk by itself. This
is admittedly questionable – but it is not obvious that such “dread” should always be rejected.
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See, e.g., Sunstein, Arsenic, supra note___, at ___.
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See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Introduction: Cost Benefit Analysis – Legal,
Economic, and Philsophical Perspectives, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 837, 838 (2000). Adler and Posner
note:
180

Even the proponents of cost-benefit analysis do not generally argue that it should be the
sole decision procedure for administrative agencies and other governmental bodies.
There may well be scenarios where it is welfare maximizing for agencies to employ
some other procedure, such as… (nomonetized) mitidimensional assessment.
183
Cf. Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Political and Judicial Controls Over
Administrative Actions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1251 (1992).

RETHINKING PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT
61
implicit in the administrative pluralism model. But that rejection needs to be
explained.184
There may be a few reasons to look for alternative mechanisms to engage
the public in regulatory policies like those involving Section 314. One is simply
the chance to advance some workable version of participatory democracy by
advantage of the legal structure of the administrative state, which is already set
up to harmonize public participation and technical competence. Some people
may care simply because they think administrative pluralism is just not a very
convincing theory of the legitimacy of the administrative state. Still others
might recognize practical reasons to look for new options for achieving public
engagement: alternative arrangements could allow regulators to obtain different
kinds of information about public reactions to regulatory policy. That
information may later become politically or technically valuable, such as when
an exogenous shock like a terrorist attack suddenly makes transportation security
far more salient than the typical poll respondent might have thought before
September 11. And regulators charged with crafting rules that depend on public
compliance (e.g., speed limits) may benefit from alternative mechanisms that
shed richer insight into public perceptions of regulatory issues. But how would
these alternatives work in practice?
IV.
CORRECTIVE AND MAJORITARIAN DELIBERATION APPROACHES ARE
REASONABLE ALTERNATIVES TO EXISTING MODES OF PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT
The existing approach to public engagement has a tenacious hold, but
there is no reason why the administrative state should be imprisoned by it.
Alternative arrangements are both possible and (I shall argue) desirable. For
example, a corrective approach would try to sample people that should
obviously have interest but are not adequately represented (with some
appropriate metric for making this decision). The majoritarian deliberation
approach would involve getting a stratified random sample of the population as a
whole.185 Either one of the alternative approaches could involve selecting a small
group or groups through stratified random sampling of some population (i.e., the
national population, or some subgroup especially likely to be affected). The
difference in these approaches reflects two different conceptions of participatory
democracy – one focused on the importance of including interests who will be
particularly affected by the decision, and another on creating a space for people
184

Some might take my criticisms and conclude outright tha public engagement should not be so
central to the legitimacy of the administrative state. I think that position is hard to sustain for
reasons discussed earlier involving the value of democracy. See supra note___.
185
Obviously, at some level the entire population has some kind of “interest,” so the distinction
between the two approaches is driven by how low one sets the “interest” threshold.
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to engage in majoritarian deliberation about the regulatory matter in question.186
In principle, individuals and groups consulted through these alternative
approaches could offer both their raw initial opinions but also their reactions to
information about the nature of the agency’s mandate, the scientific and
technical problems with different regulatory possibilities, and the views of
different constituencies that would be affected by the regulation. The existence
of these alternatives does not mean the existing approach is always wrong:
letting participation be driven by self-designated interested parties might make
sense, or it might not. Like everything in life, these alternatives have costs – but
they should be judged alongside their potential benefits. That is exactly the
point: choosing between all these approaches poses the question of when it is
just fine to use the existing administrative pluralism approach, when we should
be more interested in including people affected but not organized to participate,
and when it is better to let regulatory decisions be informed by deliberation
groups that are explicitly majoritarian in nature.
A.

The Core of the Corrective Approach is a Mechanism to Identify
Stakeholders and to Integrate Their Views Into the Regulatory Process

Practices like negotiated rulemaking occasionally involve agencies in
187
figuring out who might be affected by a particular rulemaking proceeding.
Through negotiated rulemaking, the agency determines who might be interested
in participating in the rulemaking proceeding in order to reach an early
consensus on the proposed rule. But the point of negotiated rulemaking is not
explicitly to identify people or constituencies who might have a particular
interest and yet run the risk of being unrepresented. Instead, the major purpose
of negotiated rulemaking is to enhance rules, reduce litigation, and shorten the
rulemaking process by providing a mechanism for consensus rulemaking
proposals.188
186

Verba, Schlozman, and Brady capture this distinction nicely. See supra note___, at 528:

In one conception of democracy, politics is the arena for the working out of the selfinterested claims of citizens. According to this view of the meaning of democracy,
participatory inequalities matter because they jeopardize equal protection of interests….
There is another conception of democracy embedded in our discussion for which our
findings are germane. According to this vision, a democracy in which self-interested
citizens compete for benefits is inadequate. In a fully participatory democracy, political
activity becomes a mechanism whereby citizens engage in enlightened discourse, some
to understand the views of others, and become sensitized to the needs of the community
and the nation.
187
See generally Matthew J. McKinney, Negotiated Rulemaking: Involving Citizens in Public
Decisions, 60 MONT. L. REV. 499 (1999).
188
Note that negotiated rulemaking does not always seem to live up to its expectations. See, e.g.,
Cary Coglianese, Assessing the Advocacy of Negotiated Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. ENVT’L L. REV.
386 (2001).
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Imagine extending just one aspect of the agency’s mandate during a
negotiated rulemaking procedure – identifying interests that are likely to be
particularly affected by the regulation. The goal here would not be to speed up
the regulatory process but instead to do something that might seem to go in
precisely the opposite direction: including people who will clearly be impacted
by the regulation but may lack the sophistication to gracefully articulate their
concerns, and giving those people a chance to constructively voice their
interests. The process would involve at least three components: (1) selecting a
“corrective” sample of people, (2) providing a setting in which they could voice
their concerns in a way that corrects for deficiencies in sophistication (i.e.,
through assistance from counsel or a facilitator), and (3) devising a process
through which an agency would be nudged to take seriously the resulting
opinions. A lawyer from the agency or an independent agency might then be
charged with advocating for the deliberation group’s ideas.189
Imagine how this could work in the context of Section 314. The agency
charged with issuing the regulations (i.e., Treasury), perhaps along with a
separate specialized agency focused on public engagement (call it a participation
agency),190 make an initial determination about who is likely to be particularly
affected by the regulations but unlikely to represent themselves – including,
among others, smaller banks and credit unions, bank employees, or legitimate
customers particularly likely to be concerned about privacy. No doubt that it
would be difficult to design a defensible system for choosing “who will be
especially affected yet unlikely to adequately represent themselves.”
Together, Treasury and the participation agency might break down the
task into a few different pieces. One is to define the kinds of benefits and
burdens that could be caused by the proposed regulation if it went into effect
(i.e., privacy intrusions that could result in unauthorized disclosure, changes in
the probability of being subjected to time-consuming, costly, or harrowing
investigation, new tasks for financial institution employees). Another is to make
189

The lawyer’s role would be to represent overall tendency of the deliberative group’s
conclusion. In the absence of consensus, the lawyer would highlight the group’s majority
position, with perhaps some brief additional attention to the views of any significant minority.
All of this raises the question of how the agenda for the group’s discussion will be set, how the
materials and moderator for the discussion will be selected, and how the lawyer’s incentives will
be structured to foster faithful representation of the group’s views. These are not always easy
questions, but they can be solved. Jury deliberations, mock jury and focus group arrangements,
deliberative polls, and experimental studies all shed some light on how to resolve the issue of
agenda-setting, moderators, and materials. The lawyers’ behavior can be addressed in part
through employee selection and performance audits. Which raises the question of how executive
branch officials, legislators, and interest groups affect the process. I deal with this in Part V,
infra.
190
The separate agency can serve as an important repository of expertise – which is hardly
irrelevant here and may shed important light on how to determine who is interested. A variation
on this would make the centralized agency more specialized – focusing on the representation of
people with particular kinds of interests, such as privacy concerns.
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some considered judgment about who among members of the general
population may disproportionately bear the preceding benefits and costs. The
methodology for making this determination could range from relying in part on a
sub-sample of people who wrote in comments (admittedly an imperfect
mechanism, but perhaps suitable for some issues) to computer simulations or
good-faith estimates. In any case, the goal here would be to get a picture of how
the regulation might operate in a world where the agency making use of it (in
this case, an entity like the FBI) would be making discretionary decisions about
its use. This phase of the process could result, for example, in a conclusion that
recent immigrants from the Middle East who make small wire transfers would be
especially likely to trigger scrutiny.191 Finally, once the agency has made this
determination, it might consider whether the constituencies disproportionately
affected are constructively represented in the process. This might include
considering the sophistication (or even existence) of comments from some of the
impacted constituencies. The agency would then select a small number of
people in the “underrepresented” constituencies to take part in the rulemaking
192
process.
How exactly would the selected participants take part in the regulatory
process? A mass of comments that do not even distinguish between the Patriot
Act (let alone Section 314) and the regulations themselves would not be as
useful as comments that acknowledge that Section 314 is the law of the land
while providing specific suggestions of how to write the desired regulations. At
least two possibilities are worth considering here. One is to provide people with
a sort of deliberative forum. Some group of people numbering between 7 and 15
might be chosen to deliberate.193 They would all get balanced materials
explaining the arguments for and against the proposed regulation.194 Then they
would get the chance to talk to each other and question experts from the agency
about the possible alternatives. The agency would use the existing proposed
regulations as a basis for discussion. The goal of the deliberation would not be
191

Cf. Cuéllar, supra note ___, at ____.
The resulting assemblage of participations could not be called representative of the interests of
the larger population. While the notion of the government deciding who to include as affected
parties may strike some as troubling, it is not without precedent: government agencies often have
a legal obligation to consider the implication of a regulatory rule on some relatively
unrepresented constituency, like small business. See, e.g., Exec. Order 13272 (requiring
agencies to consider the implications of their regulations on small businesses). It is not obvious
that allowing agencies to simply claim that they are considering the interests of a constituency
results is better than actually getting people from that constituency to comment. During the
Carter Administration, the Department of Agriculture sought to obtain more comments from
groups that were affected by regulations establishing agricultural marketing orders for
commodities. Among other things, the department investigated “public attitudes and views on a
planned marketing order through a solicitation of comments mailed directly to affected groups.”
Kerwin, supra note___, at 171.
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See SIDNEY VERBA, SMALL GROUPS AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR (1961).
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The agency would prepare these with oversight from the centralized agency.
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to subject the regulations to an up-or-down vote but rather to elicit concerns,
observations, and ideas about how the regulation should evolve.195 Part of what
the process would have to accomplish is to separate the factual issues best
resolved through expert analysis from interpretation of an ambiguous statute and
policy judgments. The deliberation group would be in a position to inform what
to do about the latter but not necessarily the former.196
Finally there is the question of giving legal effect to the corrective
sample’s deliberations. For the moment, imagine only that their deliberations
inform the rulemaking process and become part of the record. Accordingly, the
public can raise valid concerns given the statutory scheme, and these in turn can
become a basis for litigation. Later I will consider other alternatives that give
legal effect to the deliberations.197 In the meantime, the most important point is
that the corrective sample’s deliberations would have some legal effect – for
example, by creating a presumption in favor of a particular regulatory strategy,
such as the issuance of Section 314 regulations with a remedy for unauthorized
disclosure of sensitive financial information.
B.

The Majoritarian Deliberation Approach Calls For Obtaining a Sample
of Citizens to Deliberate

This leaves another alternative to the administrative pluralism model -the majoritarian approach. By “majoritarian,” I mean the idea that decisions are
best made by deliberative, electoral majorities or some sort of equivalent proxy.
A popular referendum is not the only way to involve a wider slice of the public
in regulatory decisions. Majoritarian deliberation implies a process where a
majority makes a decision in accordance with its views about what would be best
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Cf. Luskin, Fishkin, & Jowell, supra note ___, at 463. Their description of a deliberative poll
in the United Kingdom provides one example of how the deliberation groups could function:
On Friday evening, the participants spent 45 minutes in plenary session being
welcomed, watching a brief documentary describing the issues they would be
discussing, and being reminded of what lay before them. On Saturday, they spent threeand-a-half hours in small group discussions, then three hours in large group exchanges
with panels of experts fielding questions, then another hour back in the small groups.

The difference here, of course, is that the subject matter is not as general as what participants in
the deliberative poll had to discuss. Instead of fairly open-ended questions about criminal justice
policy (for example), the basis for discussion among the deliberation groups would be the
agency’s proposed rule.
196
See Part IV.a
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See id. for additional technical details involving the presentation of information to the
deliberation group.
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for the polity.198 Regardless of whether this is practically feasible (it may not
be), it represents a particular view of what regulatory policymaking should be.
To some people the legislature (and perhaps even the rulemaking
process) is already providing a mechanism to represent majority views. All this
talk about a “majoritarian” deliberation alternative may therefore seem confusing
since the regulatory rulemaking process is often analogized to the legislative
process, which is often assumed to be majoritarian.199 But neither the rulemaking
process nor legislation necessarily live up to this idea. For one, electoral
majorities can differ in their views about regulatory policy when compared to
mobilized, economically and politically powerful interest groups.200 The
preceding sections highlight how different the reality of the regulatory
rulemaking process is from some kind of ideal version of majoritarian
deliberation. To be sure, elected politicians can intervene on behalf of electoral
majorities to affect regulatory policy when the issues in question have mass
political appeal. But once again, this sort of argument assumes a view about
democracy that has to be defended. The administrative pluralism view leaves it
to interest groups and voters to figure out what matters in regulatory policy, and
in politics more generally. Anything that is not already important enough to
voters when it comes time to vote or make a donation to an interest group is
assumed not to matter.
In contrast, the majoritarian deliberation alternative is grounded in the
premise that perhaps democracy should consider individuals’ informed opinions,
not just their superficial reactions. As with the corrective approach, the idea is
that informing people and giving them a chance to deliberate could shed light on
what satisfies their own interests. In addition, the chance to learn and deliberate
might signal to participants that there is some value in thinking beyond their self201
interest when they consider the regulatory decision.
198

It is the sort of process reminiscent of Rousseau’s discission of the “general will.” See JEANJAQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT OR PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL RIGHT 5
(WORDSWORTH CLASSICS 1998) (1762).
199
See generally ERIC SCHICKLER, DISJOINTED PLURALISM (2001)
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By “electoral majorities,” I mean majorities of voters in a particular jurisdiction. What
constitutes a majority obviously depends on the boundaries of the jurisdiction and the process
through which preferences are aggregated. See ISSACHAROFF, KARLAN, & PILDES, supra note
148, at 1 (“At the heart of a democratic political order lies a process of collective decisionmaking
that must operate through pre-existing laws, rules, and institutions. The kind of democratic
politics we have is always and inevitably itself a product of institutional forms and legal
structures.”).
201
This is not meant to suggest that individual participants could ever (or should) put aside their
own interests. Such interests are important and the existing model does not represent these.
Moreover, personal interests may serve as a heuristic through which voters can form views about
a complicated policy. Nonetheless, the deliberative process might expand the scope of that
inquiry and get people to think about how others might be affected. Whether this happens
because people are genuinely capable of altruism or because people simply further expand the
scope of their own evaluations of their self-interest does not really matter that much. The point is
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Implementing the majoritarian deliberation approach is a lot like
implementing the corrective approach: there needs to be a way of selecting the
sample of people, a space to deliberate and learn about the issue, and a means of
giving their input at least some legal effect. The major difference is in the
selection of the sample. Here the participation agency would not need to figure
out a way to discern who might be especially affected. Instead the animating
vision of democracy here is to provide a group of laypeople (as a proxy for a
majority) with the chance to shape the regulatory process. If the goal is
something other than a referendum, then the group would have to be small
enough to make it feasible to educate its members and to give them a chance to
deliberate among themselves.202 In short, the process would involve selecting a
stratified random sample of people from throughout the country, helping them
understand Section 314, and asking them what they think. As before, a lot of the
choices about the structure of the deliberative process are really about how to
create the relevance condition. To the extent that such a relevance condition
could be met, the majoritarian deliberation approach would focus on eliciting the
views of people regarding what regulation would be in the putative interests of
the polity, rather than on considering whether people with strong interests
support or oppose the policy in question.
C.

Some of the Technical Challenges Posed by Either Approach Could be
Resolved by Creating an Independent Agency

Both the corrective and the majoritarian deliberation alternatives share
the same three major technical problems: selecting the sample, creating the
opportunity for the sample of people to learn and deliberate (i.e., in a way that
fulfills the third condition), and deciding what legal impact will be given to the
public’s input. The participation agency to which I have already alluded could
help solve all these problems and protect the integrity of the public engagement
process.
In some rare cases agencies may be able to implement the alternatives
with their existing resources and legal authorities. But the real promise of the
alternatives might best be realized through the creation of a separate agency.
The new “participation agency” could handle several functions that would all
support government decisionmaking about regulatory policy, and in particular
public participation in the regulatory process. A separate agency would have a
specific mandate to enhance decisionmaking across agencies, without having to
concern itself with competing tasks involving civil servants and political
appointees who get invested with a specific point of view. Its leadership might
consist of a board of appointees with fixed, staggered terms. Their job would be
that they might view an issue differently when they have a chance to talk to people about it and
learn about it. Cf. Luskin, Fishkin, & Jowell, supra note ____, at ____.
202
See Hackman, supra note___, at___.
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to supervise the staff in discharging a few interrelated functions. First, the
agency would promulgate rules203 for how members of the public would be
selected to participate in deliberation groups. Second, the agency would prepare
risk and cost-benefit analysis materials that would be presented to either
corrective or majoritarian deliberation groups. These analyses would be
designed to complement those of the agency with direct responsibility for the
regulatory program. Deliberation groups would therefore get more than one
point of view about the risks, costs, and benefits associated with any given
proposal. Third, the participation agency would provide trained moderators to
facilitate the discussion among either the corrective or the majoritarian
deliberation groups. Finally, the agency would provide the lawyers to take the
contributions of participants and turn these into more sophisticated comments
that would become part of the administrative record.
The agency would also have the responsibility of promoting the
participation of people selected to be part of the deliberation group associated
with the majoritarian deliberation approach. This would require legislation
giving people some incentive to participate (or forcing them to bear some cost if
they did not). Potential participants could be enticed with a financial reward, a
mild penalty for non-participation, or a combination of both. Otherwise valuable
people would be excluded and there would be overrepresentation of people for
whom the opportunity cost of participation is lower. This is probably what
happens when laypeople participate in the notice and comment process. While
the participants in the Section 314 rulemaking proceeding made intelligible
contributions and raised concerns about an important issue, neither their degree
of unsophistication, nor their substantive views, are likely to be representative of
the larger public. Members of the public with more sophistication are likely to
be the kinds of people who face a higher opportunity cost from participating in
rulemaking instead of spending time with their kids, their friends, their garden,
or advancing their careers. If the alternatives are to enrich the administrative
state with perspectives that are largely ignored today, then there must be
participation from among these higher-opportunity cost folk. In any case, the
defining features of the alternatives would be to get participants as close to the
actual decision as possible, instead of keeping their input general. The more
specific the feedback, transmitted through a moderator or legal representative,
the more possible it would be for the implementing agency to grapple directly
with public input about specific proposals.204
203

The first set of rules could be promulgated subject to the traditional notice-and-comment
process to avoid an infinite regress problem.
204
Otherwise the implementing agency has to do all the work of translating vague opinions into
regulations, which may be no different from agency responses to a vague delegation and
therefore no different from the status quo. Obviously, there is a limit to the public’s potential
sophistication (even after all the institutional reforms I have described). My point is that
sophistication is not fixed in the “low” position. The people participating in the corrective
mechanism will have less of a challenge, because (by definition) they will be motivated by their
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There is also the question of how much all this would cost. Between
1981 and 2000, the number of regulations considered important enough to be
reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget totaled 34,386.205 While this
averages to about 3,800 a year, the number of rules reviewed in some years is
considerably less (about 500 per year in the late 1990s).206 Depending on the
details of how they are structured, the alternatives might cost as little as a focus
group. The higher the projected cost, the more it would make sense to try the
proposals through a pilot project. Regardless of whether the alternatives are
implemented through pilot projects, I do not expect the agency would to solve all
the problems associated with the alternatives. But it could help address them
and in the process it would create opportunities to protect the public engagement
process from naked manipulation by the agencies or their political superiors.
D. The Alternatives to Pluralism Force A Choice Between Different Kinds of
Administrative Democracy
By making it possible to supplement or replace the administrative
pluralism model, the alternatives would force a choice between different
conceptions of administrative democracy. Different issues may call for
dissimilar versions of democracy. If it is possible to solve the technical
problems associated with the alternative approaches to public involvement in the
administrative state, then how is one to choose among them? That depends on
the version – or vision – of democracy that seems appropriate for particular
kinds of problems. The question is difficult because there is no one right
answer. Prosperous countries mix and match different kinds of democratic
207
This implies that economic and political prosperity
procedures successfully.
do not depend completely on adoption of a vision of democracy.208 Neither does
the U.S. Constitution hardwire a single version of democracy for the
administrative state, even if it does proscribe many features of representative
stake in the outcome (they may even be experts with a “professional” stake in the regulatory
policy). The majoritarian mechanism could take advantage of techniques like panels of
competing experts, contingent valuation, and pedagogically sound uses of analogical reasoning,
the public participating
205
See Steven P. Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical
Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 846 (2003). The Office of Management and Budget
Reviews only “economically major” and otherwise “significant” rules, and only 1,693 were
economically significant during the relevant time-period.
206
Id.
207
See, e.g., DAVID M. FARRELL, COMPARING ELECTORAL SYSTEMS (1997).
208
This is not to say that visions of democracy are inconsequential. As I have argued in this
paper, visions of democracy matter because they allow for different kinds of participation and
different sorts of information to reach decisionmakers. Differing visions of democracy do more
than just create expectations about law and government. They reward some interests and
disadvantage others. The point is that practical constraints involving economic development and
politics do not rule out all but one particular version of democracy in the administrative state.

RETHINKING PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT
70
political institutions.209 Indeed, while the federal constitution’s architecture
obviously relies heavily on representative politics,210 legislatures can delegate
power. That opens up the question of how democracy should work its way into
the regulatory process, and what kind of democracy one prefers. Here I provide
some notes about how one might think through these questions.
The most important point here is that participation has costs as well as
211
benefits. I have argued elsewhere that rethinking public engagement can result
in regulations that might be more widely accepted and appreciated if the public
learned their details. The alternatives could also provide agencies and
representative politicians with useful information about how to communicate
risk to the public, and would help make the regulatory system more consistent
with its alleged aspiration of taking seriously the concerns raised by the public.212
At the same time, the alternatives will have some financial costs. Hiring
moderators, lawyers, and analysts takes money, as does the compensation of
people selected to be part of the deliberation groups. Moreover, participation
can slow down regulation. Deliberation groups would need to be chosen,
constituted, and dismissed. Agency lawyers would need to take more time to
think about the concerns raised in the deliberation groups. Delay is not always a
problem, as poorly thought-out regulation may be worse than no regulation at
all. But it may be a problem in the sense that statutes passed by Congress reflect
an interest in getting regulations implemented. All of this means that the
benefits of the alternatives may not always exceed the costs.213
Even if one does not accept that the alternative approaches rest on a
uniformly “better” or more defensible approach to democracy, one might accept
209

But note that the Constitution leaves open many of the most important rules of electoral
competition. The Voting Rights Act, the recent electoral reform legislation and associated
appropriations, and the requirement that the House of Representatives have only 435 members
are just a few examples of how some of the rules of the political game are not set directly by the
constitutional text.
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The “Republican guarantee” clause has been held not to mean much of anything as a practical
matter. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 184 (1992) (finding no violation and stating
“[T]he Guarantee Clause has been an infrequent basis for litigation throughout our history. In
most of the cases in which the Court has been asked to apply the Clause, the Court has found the
claims presented to be nonjusticiable under the "political question" doctrine.); Murtishaw v.
Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 961 (9th Cir. 2001) (“challenge based on the Guarantee Clause,
however, is a nonjusticiable political question”); Padavan v. United States, 82 F.3d 23, 27 (2nd
Cir 1996) (noting traditionally “claims brought under the Guarantee Clause are nonjusticiable
political questions” and to the extent that this is not always the case, exceptions are rare). Direct
democracy is not considered per se a violation of any federal constitutional guarantee against
arbitrary decisions, see Cuhyoga Falls, xx U.S. at ___ (2003), or any other kind of constitutional
guarantee for that matter.
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See, e.g., Rossi, supra note 161, at ___.
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See supra Part II.b____ .
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The question of regulatory agency inaction is worth thinking about separately. One might
think that Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985), is wrong, but as it stands today it limits the
public’s ability (or that of any interest group) to compel regulatory action.
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that choosing the right kind of approach to public engagement depends a little
on the circumstances. For example, one might imagine a few relevant criteria.
1. First is the question of how much the regulation has a direct,
disproportionate impact on particular groups and individuals.214 In the
context of Section 314, this might mean (in addition to financial
institutions) people who are especially likely to arouse suspicion or who
might have particularly strong (but perfectly legal) reasons to seek
privacy in their financial records. One might think that some policies just
violate “rights,” but the language of rights is not necessary to conclude
that some issues are best suited to the corrective approach because of
their disproportionate impact on a limited number of people not
adequately served by the administrative pluralism model of public
engagement.
2. Just as the concentration of costs matters, so might the dispersal or
concentration of benefits. Section 314 might be an example: the alleged
benefits of added national security are not concentrated among a few
people (although in reality law enforcement authorities might benefit
disproportionately). This sort of pattern might highlight the value of
something like the majoritarian deliberation approach.
3. Quite apart from whether the statutory requirements primarily call for an
explicitly technical or scientific determination, there is the question of
just how much an individual layperson can understand. I have argued
that the capacity (or “sophistication”) is more malleable than has been
recognized. Nonetheless, it is possible to imagine a situation where the
legislature passes an ambiguous statute that still depends primarily on
scientific knowledge. One could argue if there is any such thing as pure
“scientific knowledge,” but some issues are more opaque than others to
215
laypeople.
Is it possible for the administrative state to avoid all these questions? Of
course it is. The machinery of regulation would then grind on relying only on
the administrative pluralism model, spinning out its regulatory rules, working
214

Some people might insist that impact should be understood in the aggregate, so that a less
direct impact affecting a large number of people should be given some weight. Obviously, a
major feature of the majoritarian deliberation alternative is its capacity to pierce through the
public’s initial impression that an issue simply does not concern them. But there should be some
separate discussion about people who may be said to bear a particularly heavy and direct cost of
a regulation, such as individuals living close to a proposed Superfund site, or workers who have
been shown through some defensible analysis to be at particularly high risk of losing their job if
the regulation is implemented.
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through its legal powers, and balancing its deceptively simple scale of costs and
benefits. That path implies blindness – both to alternative conceptions of
democracy and to the concerns that might otherwise inform the administrative
state. It makes little sense to regulate by pretending that some important costs
or benefits are just not there, and neither does it make sense to ignore questions
about the appropriate kind of administrative democracy. The problem is politics
makes it easy to choose blindness.
V.
THE MAJOR DIFFICULTY WITH THE ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES IS THEIR
POLITICAL VIABILITY
As a theory of legitimacy, administrative pluralism does a lot of work for
the administrative state. It helps put the existing approach in the best possible
light, solving a cluster of questions about how the public should be involved in
regulatory decisionmaking. Here I discuss some of the political economy behind
the tenacious hold of the existing approach and the conceptual theory that
supports it. I also sketch three political scenarios that might give life to the
alternative approaches that I have described. Since these scenarios depend on
certain preconditions, some of which are unlikely, no one is likely to topple the
administrative pluralism model anytime soon.
A. The Major Players in Regulatory Policy Find the Existing Approach Attractive
Beyond all the conceptual appeal of administrative pluralism, there is
also a straightforward political reality bolstering the existing, interest-group
centered approach to public engagement: what the legislature delegates and the
president oversees can affect interest groups endowed with economic and
216
political power, who can themselves affect representative politicians. Later I
explain how this makes the administrative pluralism model difficult to change.217
For now it is enough to observe that legislatures shaping the developing
administrative system probably harbored a substantial interest in contributing to
the development of an administrative state that could be subject to their
oversight, and (just as important) could generate information about the impact of
regulatory policy on important constituencies. Viewed in this light, the APA and
its notice-and-comment procedures become part of a fire-alarm approach to
overseeing the bureaucracy. As one article describes it:
216

By this I mean specifically interest groups that command sufficient economic and political
resources to materially impact (though not necessarily to determine) the success of representative
politicians in their electoral pursuit of office or in the realization of related political objectives.
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See infra Part IV.c, at _____.
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When something goes awry, constituents pull the fire alarm, bringing the
attention of political officials down on agency proceedings. To the extent
that sustained congressional attention is costly to an agency, it will seek to
avoid attention by serving congressional constituents so that alarms do not
get pulled. Nevertheless, if agencies can keep their actions secret, especially
if they can conspire with particular interests against others, congressional
interests might not know about agency proceedings until it is too late… The
APA helps mitigate this problem by requiring a substantial degree of
transparency… Affected constituents must be notified in advance of
proceedings and given opportunities to participate and provide their views.218
If politicians care about fire alarms and interest group opposition, then they
would want a system that responds to political power as well as interest. The
resulting model of public engagement would predictably have a focus on
generating information about the views of people and groups who would most be
willing to expend resources to shape the regulations in question – or to punish
politicians and bureaucrats for an unwelcome one.
The Final Report of the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative
Procedure (issued in 1941) suggests that even before passage of the APA,
agencies already understood the value of avoiding confrontation with interest
groups that might undermine the agency in Congress:
Early in the present century a number of agencies appear to have adopted
regularized consultation in connection with their rule-making processes….
The practice of holding conferences of interested parties in connection with
rule-making introduces an element of give-and-take on the part of those
present and affords an assurance to those in attendance that their evidence
and points of view are known and will be considered. As a procedure for
permitting private interests to participate in the rule-making process it is as
definite and may be as adequate as a formal hearing. If the interested parties
are sufficiently known and are not too numerous or too hostile to discuss the
problems presented conferences have evident advantages over hearings in the
development of knowledge and understanding.219
The report implies that the goal of administrative procedures to involve
the public should be to involve interested parties. None of this implies that
powerful interest groups would exclusively rely on administrative procedures
like the notice-and-comment process to signal their displeasure to politicians.
Interested parties could also rely on having their allies serve as political
appointees or deploying congressional staffers to gather information. Nor is it
218
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necessary to argue that the sole or primary purpose of administrative procedures
was to benefit politicians’ favored interest groups.220 Instead the contention is
that, on balance, the APA and associated procedures probably helped (and
continues to help) politicians track the reactions of outside interest groups, a
development that in turn could advance their electoral and policy agendas.
Thus there is more than just a conceptual attraction to the administrative
pluralism model. There is a political and economic logic behind its brawn. The
result is a system that does not necessarily benefit everyone, nor does it live up
to all the ideals participatory democracy. But the administrative pluralism model
certainly makes it easier for interest groups and representative politicians to
work with the administrative state to achieve their goals.
B. The Status Quo Can Be Upset Under Certain Conditions
All of the preceding makes any substantive change in the direction of the
alternatives quite difficult. But change is not necessarily impossible, so in
closing let me provide a sketch of three scenarios that could bolster the
alternatives. The three scenarios reflect the premise that ambiguous statutes do
not represent legislators’ genuine desire to defer to experts, but instead a political
221
That compromise may, in turn, be affected by politicians’
compromise.
guesses about what sorts of policies are politically palatable.222 Figuring out
what precisely is politically acceptable (by congressional district, by state, or by
national electorate) is difficult, perhaps even for politicians who survive a
competitive process weeding out the ones who cannot do the figuring very well.
Nonetheless, some guesses about the political popularity of legislation are
probably easier to make than others, and sometimes politicians just get it
wrong.223
Here is one scenario. Politicians often use opinion polls as an important
tool for shedding light on what voters want. The information they provide can
supplement politicians’ own sense of how voters stand on the issues most likely
to matter in elections (such as crime and the economy). Meanwhile, with few
exceptions regulatory issues are likely to seem uninteresting and relatively
unimportant by comparison, unless of course there is a some incident or shock,
making a previously unimportant issue very relevant. For example, the
September 11 attacks could transform terrorist financing counter-measures from
something marginally important into a centrally important issue. The same
220
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could be said for transportation security policy. In such situations, voters’ precrisis responses in opinion polls would not provide an accurate perspective about
the electorate’s take on things after the crisis. This means that politicians would
have to be guessing how a crisis could affect the public’s judgment, and
therefore the politicians’ prospects in future elections.
To some extent, experts and agencies working under the aegis of the
executive branch serve as proxies for public engagement. They can also help
solve controversial matters for which politicians occasionally want to avoid
responsibility. But the alternative approaches could perform useful functions,
helping provide additional insulation from responsibility when politicians have
to deal with a hot potato. One useful function would be to help provide an
additional line of insulation from responsibility when politicians have to
prospectively deal with a scalding hot potato – a means of dropping a cool
dollop of sour cream on the potato by saying “we didn’t make a decision, and it
was so important we didn’t even want the experts to do it by themselves. We
had real people help us make the decision.” The logic of this scenario would
make the viability of the alternatives depend on politicians’ beliefs about the
state of the world. The alternatives would be most attractive in the following
situation: (a) there is a high enough probability that a low-importance issue
might skyrocket in importance later on; and (b) they cannot guess what a voter
would think once circumstances forced her to reflect more about it. This means
that at least sometimes, a deliberation group could help politicians go about their
224
business of supervising the work of the administrative state. If the alternatives
were politically valuable to legislators but faced bureaucratic resistance, outside
interest groups might fund corrective or majoritarian deliberation proceedings
and then funnel the results to agencies through the existing notice-and-comment
process (perhaps with a quick “cc:” – the equivalent of a knowing glance – to
interested legislators). The corrective or deliberative proceedings themselves
might be conducted by companies or not-for-profit organizations with a
reputational interest in the integrity of the results.
Now imagine a different scenario. The alternatives are promoted by
political entrepreneurs and become popular among the public. They are not
diluted because they are used to resolve statutory ambiguities in areas where the
interest group context is not strong enough to predetermine the result. So
imagine that for some issues, interested parties lack the power or interest to
achieve objectives through the existing approach. Think, for example, of
224

If legislators decide that there is a high probability of an exogenous shock dramatically
increasing the salience of a particular issue, they may find the alternatives as desirable as the
existing procedural mechanisms to oversee the bureaucracy. In both cases, the goal is to ensure
that the output of the regulatory process redounds to the legislators’ benefit. Cf. Kathleen Bawn,
Political Control Versus Expertise: Congressional Choices About Administrative Procedures,
89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 62 (1995)(developing a formal model highlighting legislators’ interest in
designing procedures forcing agencies to make technically sound decisions that balance
competing interests as legislators intended).
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regulations governing the use of money provided to state governments for the
development of drug offender diversion programs (i.e., “drug courts”). If no
group is strong enough to sway the policy, legislations might see a political
payoff in telling the electorate that the public will be more involved in these
decisions.225
There is still a third scenario. Suppose public-spirited legislators and
bureaucrats promote the alternatives as a means of allocating political
responsibility – even when there is some short-term (or even longer-term)
personal political gain for them from maintaining the status quo. This is unlikely
but not impossible. It is unlikely because political constraints give legislators a
reason to support the existing arrangement instead of some more elaborate
approach to participatory democracy in the administrative state.226 But change
under this scenario is possible because those political constraints do not always
overwhelm (at least in principle) countervailing impulses to pursue the
alternatives. I have argued above that some of those impulses could arise from
the possibility that the alternatives are politically popular. What is also possible
is that policymakers would just be curious to know what the alternatives can
reveal. “What would a group of unaffiliated outside expert think of this?” might
wonder a legislator asking an agency to use the corrective approach. An agency
official might wonder if deliberating citizens share her intuition about the need
for an adequate margin of safety in drinking water regulations governing the
permissible concentration of arsenic.
None of the above scenarios guarantee success in reforming public
engagement in the administrative state. In the meantime, some things
resembling the corrective approach are already in use, such as negotiated
rulemaking, blue-ribbon commissions, and the selection of political appointees
from constituencies that are impacted by an agency’s regulations. On occasion
politicians can use these tactics to supplement the political mechanisms of the
APA. What is unsatisfying about these approaches is that, unlike the corrective
approach I have described, there is no explicit discussion of what interests are
likely to have a big stake in the regulation but lack the sophistication, interest, or
ability to overcome collective action problems. Which means, by and large, that
these approaches fail to address the endogeneity of sophistication and interest.
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Cf. Hugo Hopenhayn and Susanne Lohmann, Fire-Alarm Signals and the Political Oversight
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demonstrate the implication that interest-group “information providers may have incentives to
deceive the political recipient of their signals in order to manipulate her decisions”). Indeed,
politicians may seldom be in a position to ascertain whether interest groups are providing
accurate information about agencies. Sometimes politicians will be able to learn what they need
just by knowing that certain interest groups are opposed to a regulatory policy, because the
interest group opposition makes enough of a difference to an electorate outcome. But where
interest groups are not powerful enough to offset the electoral benefits of a particular policy, then
politicians may prefer to have some independent mechanism to inform them about what the
larger public thinks of specific regulatory policies.
226
See infra Part V.a.

RETHINKING PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT
77
Some people might think that the alternatives I have suggested will be
costly to society, at least in the beginning. To pursue the alternatives,
government would need to find and train moderators and lawyers, experiment
with the format for the deliberation groups, and defend the approach from the
slings of opposing interest groups who either reject the premise or wonder about
the political impact of the alternative approaches on their agendas. Even if
sometimes the alternative approaches were close to being politically viable, they
would create legal friction. This is because the administrative pluralism model is
so closely identified with the larger legal foundations of the administrative state.
Delegation problems seem easier when everyone insisted that agencies were just
scientists necessary to figure out the problem. I have tried to show that
connection between delegation and expertise to be more apparent than real, but
the legacy of that insistence on linking expertise and the administrative state is
the entrenchment of the administrative pluralism model. Lawyers, judges,
regulators, and executive branch officials who try to undermine this model create
friction, because the alternative approaches are premised on very different
assumptions. Those assumptions challenge the dominance of expertise and the
adequacy of our existing reservoir of regulatory democracy. Which means the
political viability of the alternative approaches depends on changing ideas as
well as interest group politics.
CONCLUSION
Some are in darkness
And others are in light
We see those in [the] light
227
Those in darkness, we do not see.
--Bertolt Brecht
Threepenny Opera

Since the modern administrative state was born, it has been characterized
by a widely accepted approach to the question of how to involve the public in
shaping regulatory policy. That approach begins by limning the basic process of
regulation -- from interpreting the statute to analyzing the plots of air-quality
graphs -- as one that primarily involves the application of technical and scientific
expertise. This exercise of authority is then rendered democratically accountable
through the machinery of representative politics and through mild “notice-andcomment” public participation from people interested in the regulation. And the
entire process is policed against arbitrariness and lawlessness by courts. While
227
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the existing approach has been the subject of some attacks over its history, most
judges, policymakers, and commentators have considered it unrealistic to expect
any major change in it. Laypeople seem to lack the time and intellectual ability
to think about effluent standards, alternative energy sources, or financial
information disclosure requirements.
Regulation by referendum seems
ludicrous, even in times of crisis where traditional interest group advocates are
overwhelmed by the rapid pace of legal changes. Yet it also seems unrealistic to
force legislators to make all the major regulatory decisions themselves. So
legislators continue making broad delegations of legal authority. These
delegations, and the administrative state as a whole, seem most legitimate to
people who believe in what I have called administrative pluralism: a descriptive
theory emphasizing that organized interests have the power to influence
regulatory policy, and a normative theory that such influence results in
reasonably coherent, legitimate, and desirable regulatory policy.
The problem is the assumptions of administrative pluralism do not fit
reality very well. The public’s ability to understand regulatory policy is not
fixed. Neither is the public’s degree of interest in a regulatory matter that, on the
surface, seems little more than an opportunity for experts to engage in hairsplitting discussions. As Section 314 and other matters demonstrate, many
regulatory issues are not scientific issues, or even matters primarily involving
technical assessments of probability and risk. Technical expertise can shed light
on the problem, but cannot really solve the problem of striking a balance
between competing values. Even beyond the national security context, interest
groups directly affected by regulations vigorously contest expert judgments and
228
compete to shape policy. Interest groups and the public can and do participate
in the rulemaking process. But interest group leaders may not have the same
view of the good that their members do, or the incentives to pursue it. And in
times of crisis, interest groups lacking exceptional funding and organization can
be overwhelmed by the pace of legal change. Even in ordinary times, members
of the public (whether representing interest groups or just themselves) may try to
participate in the notice and comment portion of the regulatory process, but that
participation is skewed in its sophistication, and so is the agency response to it.
All of this should lead one to question the existing approach to involving the
public in regulatory policy, and to consider feasible alternatives like the
corrective and majoritarian deliberation approaches I have proposed. Not only
do those alternatives provide regulators with valuable information that can
improve the substance of regulation, but they also force a legitimacy-enhancing
choice among different kinds of “democracy,” some of which may be better
suited for certain regulatory issues.
Advocates for the administrative state have always implied that
regulatory policy should be informed by some kind of public engagement. This
insight embodies the view that no one in the administrative state can possibly
228
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have all the answers: not the legislators who passed the law but left the details
to someone else, not the voters in whose name the law was passed, not the
regulators who write the proposed rule or the experts they consult, and not the
interest groups whose fortunes and futures may turn on the regulation. What
gets done in the administrative state therefore depends a lot on whose questions
are taken seriously. The experience with Section 314 shows that the questions
getting answered by the machinery of the administrative state are not the only
ones that matter.
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APPENDIX: METHODS AND DATA
A. Methods and Source of Data
The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) was the Treasury Department
bureau entrusted to write the regulations implementing Section 314. FinCEN provided me
with all the comments submitted by individual, business, and organizational members of the
229
public. FinCEN received and archived the comments in accordance with the requirements
230
of the APA. A number of electronic mail comments sent to FinCEN regarding Section
231
314 included no text, so these were excluded. Duplicate comments originating from the
same source were counted as a single comment from that source. The resulting number of
232
comments (172) was coded in accordance with the following criteria.
1. Commenter type: Comments were divided into four major categories: business,
organization representing business, other official not-for-profit organization,
unofficial organization, and individual. If the organization was a business or an
organization representing business, then it was further classified into four
categories: bank, non-bank financial institution (as traditionally defined to include
the provision of financial services to customers), or other business.
2. Comment sophistication: Comment sophistication was coded in two ways. First,
233
as to substance: (a) Did the commenter distinguish the regulation from the statute?
234
(b) Did the commenter indicate an understanding of the statutory requirement? (c)
Did the commenter ask for specific changes in the regulation provided in the notice
235
of proposed rulemaking? (d) Did the commenter provide at least one example or

229

See Section 314 Comments, supra note ____.
APA § 553, supra note_____.
231
Several of these comments included computer viruses. See Section 314 Comments, supra note
___.
232
Coding was performed by two coders. Intercoder reliability was assessed by randomly
selected about 20% (34) of the comments and recoding them without examining the first coder’s
work. Intercoder reliability was approximately .9.
233
This category is meant to distinguish between comments that primarily address the scope of
the underlying statute from comments that recognize in some way that the agency cannot legally
abrogate its responsibility under the statute and must therefore issue regulations of some kind.
234
Whether or not the commenter distinguishes the regulation from the statute in a comment,
there is the question of whether the commenter understands the scope of the statutory
requirement. For example, a commenter might simply use the comment to complain about a
statutory requirement that allows further flexibility for the sharing of financial information
among banks and with government in the absence of much individualized suspicion.
235
The notice-and-comment rulemaking process seems to have as a major premise that people
can provide feedback that could result in changes in a given regulation. It seems logical to think
that the chances of achieving such an impact are heightened when the commenter provides a
specific recommendation for a change in (or for maintaining a particular aspect of) the proposed
rule. In any case, the capacity to ask for such a specific change plausibly reflects a commenter’s
degree of sophistication about the rule and the underlying statute.
230
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236

separate argument for why the commenter’s concern should be addressed?
These categories were meant to shed light on the extent of the commenter’s
information about, and understanding of, the problem faced by the agency.
Comment length was the second measure. Comments of any length were coded as
being at least one page long. Any fraction of a page over a full page counted as an
additional page. A comment’s overall sophistication was defined by the product of
its length and the number of applicable qualitative sophistication categories.
3. Comment concerns:
Although comments varied substantially in their
sophistication, all of the comments coded identified at least one (and often more
than one) concern. The comments were coded according to the following
categories: (a) privacy; (b) suggestions that allegedly involved merely “technical”
changes; (c) administrative burdens on entities subject to the rule; (d) scope of, and
eligibility for, the safe harbor included in the statute; The categories were derived
from a qualitative analysis of the comments, with the objective of providing a
category for virtually all of the concerns raised by any comment.
4. Comment impact: Finally, comments were coded in accordance with whether they
raised issues that the regulatory agency actually addressed in the changes it made to
its proposed regulations. I use the term “comment impact” to describe this quality:
this implies that the comment was among one that collectively appeared to have an
effect on the agency rule. It does not imply information about whether an individual
comment had an effect on the regulations. I coded for impact by asking whether a
comment mentioned one or more of the recommendations that the agency actually
implemented. These included the following recommendations: (a) making it easier
to glean the obligations of covered financial institutions from the regulation; (b)
reducing the administrative burden on covered financial institutions by restricting
the scope of the time periods that they would have to search in order to comply with
a request; (c) expanding or clarifying the scope of “financial institutions” that would
be eligible to share information with each other subject to the statutory safe harbor
from liability; and (d) streamlining the “certification” process for financial
institutions who choose to take part in sharing information with each other under the
regulation.

B. Excerpts From Selected Comments
Commenter Type
Individual (# 9)

236

Concern Raised
Privacy

Excerpt of Comment
“I am opposed to any additional
expansion of power on the part of

This is meant to assess whether the commenter provided some measure of justification for the
concerns raised, rather than simply stating the concern without indicating why such a concern
was important. No distinction was made between self-regarding arguments (i.e., this is a
problem because it affects my business in a particular way) and public-regarding arguments (i.e.,
this is a problem because it will make Americans feel like they are constantly under surveillance,
which will chill free expression).
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the federal government. The
issues are ill defined and allow
the U.S. Treasury the opportunity
for further misconduct…. I am
willing to live with the threat of
terror rather than the creeping
exetension [sic] of a malignant
and paternalistic state.”
Individual (#126)

Privacy

“As
you
have
requested
comments, your gonna get ‘em. I
am greatly opposed to section
314 of the USA Patriot Act.
After reading it, I am left with
one hugh and necessary question.
How will any of these ‘rules’ or
provisions have any effect in
stopping
terrorism?….
We
already have statutes in effect
dealing with money laundring
[sic]. This is sufficient. Section
314 must not be implemented
[sic]. The time has come for real
police work that deters… not
reports it after the fact.”

Individual (# 121)

Privacy

“This moronic P.O.D.S. (piece of
dog s_ _t) legislation should
never have left the table of
whatever bumbling fool pit it in
print… The Supreme Court has
many times ruled that any
legislation passed by congress
that is repugnant to the
Constitution,
and/or
indecipherable to the common
man is NULL and VOID!… Are
the bureaucrats and politicians
going to give up their liberty and
freedom with
ease when
someone comes knocking on
their door to arrest them…?
What about monitoring their
money transactions…?
What
about keeping a perpetual eye on
them 24/7/365?
Are we all
adolescents or convicts needing
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the eye of ‘BIG BROTHER’.

Individual (#82)

Privacy

“This Act offends the heck out of
me. The government has no
legitimate right to involve itself
in the financial transactions of
others absent some true indicia of
criminal activity other than it
looks suspicious; that is, a
particularly large deposit, it
involves people the government
already has its eyes on, and the
like. This should not have been
passed in the first place; it having
been passed, it should be read as
narrowly as possible.”

Individual (#57)

Privacy

“I am opposed to this portion of
the Patriot Act of 2001. As a
matter of fact, the entire act is a
travesty.
The events of
th
September 11 occurred because
the FBI, CIA, and INS did not do
their jobs. That event could have
been prevented under the laws in
th
effect before September 11 but
for poor performance on the part
of those agencies. I consider the
banking provisions of this act to
be an invasion of personal
privacy, just right for another J.
Edgar Hoover to spy on innocent
people.”

Business (# 143)

Scope of Safe Harbor

“The proposed rule contains
various problems for the bank
and its affiliated companies.
Many of our affiliated companies
meet the definition of a financial
institution as that term is defined
for purposes of 314(a). A much
smaller
group
meets
the
definition
of
a
financial
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institution for purposes of 314(b).
We believe the notice of
proposed
rulemaking
is
unworkable
for
our
organization.”

Business
(#151)

Representative

Business Representative (#
161)

Scope of Safe Harbor

“Inclusion of life insurers would
not only allow the information
sharing necessary for good faith
compliance with the USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001 (Public
Law 107-56)…but also would
allow insurers the protections
necessary to execute such
information sharing activities.
As entities subject to privacy
regulations
on
information
sharing under such laws as, for
example, the Gramm-LeachBliley Act (Public Law 106-102),
life insurers would need the safe
harbor protections embodied in
the Proposed Rule in sec.
113.110(d).”

Administrability

“The proposed rule requires
firms to respond to requests for
information from FinCEN, but
does not specify how much time
a firm has to conduct the search.
The rule states, ‘[u]pon receiving
a request from FinCEN, a
financial institution shall search
its records to determine whether
it maintains or has maintained an
account for, or has engaged in
any transaction with’ the subject
of FinCEN’s request. 66 Fed.
Reg. At 9,884. The rule also
states that if a financial
institution identifies an account
or transaction, the report to
FinCEN must be made ‘as soon
as possible.’ The rule should
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make clear that financial
institutions will be provided a
reasonable amount of time to
search their records and to
respond.
The burden and
disruption to financial institutions
would be great if responses were
required within an unreasonably
short time frame.”

